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The Image of Truth: Photographic
Evidence and the Power of Analogy
Jennifer L. Mnookin*
We have but Faith: We cannot know
For Knowledge is of things we see.
Alfred Tennyson, In Memoriam'
Maxims that urge the power of images are cultural commonplaces
with which we are all too familiar: "a picture's worth a thousand
words," "seeing is believing," and so forth.2 The photograph, in
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1. ALFRED TENNYSON, In Memoriam, in TENNYSON'S POETRY 119, 120 (Robert W. Hill,
Jr. ed., 1971).
2. Some research lends credence to these adages. See, e.g., Brad E. Bell & Elizabeth F.
Loftus, Vivid Persuasion in the Courtroom, 49 J. PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT 659 (1985)
(claiming that "vivid" testimony is more persuasive than "pallid" testimony); William C. Cos-
topoulos, Persuasion in the Courtroom, 10 DuO. L. REv. 384, 406 (1972) (suggesting that more
1
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particular, has long been perceived to have a special power of
persuasion, grounded both in the lifelike quality of its depictions and
in its claim to mechanical objectivity.3 Seeing a photograph almost
functions as a substitute for seeing the real thing. As Susan Sontag
pointed out in her seminal musings on photography, "Photography
furnishes evidence. Something we hear about, but doubt, seems
proven when we're shown a photograph of it."4 Though Sontag
meant "evidence" in the general sense of proof or knowledge, her
claim holds equally true in the specifically legal context. Indeed, the
use of photographs and other kinds of machine-produced visual
images has become a routine evidentiary technique in the American
courtroom. Visual evidence has played a central role in several of the
highest-profile legal cases of the last few years-think, for example,
of the infamous videotape of the Los Angeles police officers' beating
of Rodney King,' or of the damaging photographs admitted in the
civil suit against O.J. Simpson showing him clad in Bruno Magli
shoes. 6 And it is by no means only in such sensational cases that
photographs and other kinds of visual evidence are deployed; rather,
learning takes place through vision than through the use of all other senses combined); M.I.
Posner et al., Visual Dominance: An Information Processing Account of Its Origins and Sig-
nificance, 83 PSYCHOL. REV. 157 (1976) (arguing that visual inputs dominate other sensory
modalities).
3. See generally ROLAND BARTHES, CAMERA LUCIDA: REFLECTIONS ON PHOTOGRAPHY
80 (Richard Howard trans., Hill & Wang 1981) (1980) (declaring that "the photograph is literally
an emanation of the referent"); Walter Benjamin, The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical
Reproduction, in ILLUMINATIONS 221, 221 (Hannah Arendt ed. & Harry Zohn trans., 1973)
(arguing that the aura of an individual work of art withers with the creation of photography and
the possibility of mechanical production); Lorraine Daston & Peter Galison, The Image of
Objectivity, REPRESENTATIONS, Fall 1992, at 81, 120 (suggesting that for late-19th-century
scientists, the machine, and in particular the photograph, "seemed at once a means to, and a
symbol of, mechanical objectivity").
4. SUSAN SONTAO, ON PHOTOGRAPHY 5 (1978).
5. For a selection from the mountain of popular coverage that focuses on the videotape and
its interpretations, see Chuck Hagen, Photography View: The Power of a Video Image Depends
on the Caption, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 1992, § 2, at 32; How the Defense Dissected the Tape,
NEWSWEEK, May 11, 1992, at 36; David A. Kaplan, Roll the Tape Again, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 8,
1993, at 69; Richard Lacayo, Anatomy of an Acquittal, TIME, May 11, 1992, at 30; Charles
Leerhsen, L.A.'s Violent New Video, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 18, 1991, at 53. For scholarly analysis
examining the interpretation of the videotape see Judith Butler, Endangered/Endangering:
Schematic Racism and White Paranoia, in READING RODNEY KING/READING URBAN UPRISING
15, 16, 20 (Robert Gooding-Williams ed., 1993) (describing the prosecution's failure to offer a
counterreading to the defense's presentation of the video as a collection of frozen frames and
interpreting the trial as producing "a contest within the visual field, a crisis in the certainty of
what is visible"); Kimberl6 Crenshaw & Gary Peller, Reel Time/Real Justice, in READING
RODNEY KING/READING URBAN UPRISING, supra, at 56, 66 (suggesting that "[bloth the
perception of the tape as showing a 'reasonable exercise of force' and the perception of the tape
as showing 'racist brutality' depend, not simply on the physiology of visual perceptions, but
rather on interpretation").
6. See, e.g., William Booth, Legal Experts Cite Many Factors as Making a Difference in
Simpson Verdicts, WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 1997, at A6; Elaine Lafferty, The Inside Story of How
O.J. Lost, TIME, Feb. 17, 1997, at 28; Stephanie Simon & Jim Newton, Simpson Civil Case, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 5, 1997, at A15.
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they are a taken-for-granted form of proof in many civil and criminal
cases.
7
Given the power of the photograph to provide strong represen-
tations--vivid displays that seem almost to compel belief-its
frequent and growing use as evidence may not seem at all surprising.
The origins of this significant form of evidence, however, have
received almost no scholarly attention. A smattering of recent articles
and notes have examined the evidentiary dilemmas raised by the
emergence of new forms of visual evidence, such as "day-in-the-life"
films and computer simulations.9 A few other pieces have analyzed
the various doctrinal foundations that underlie the photograph's
admissibility.1° But despite more than 125 years of photography's
7. Indeed, Charles Scott, the author of the most significant treatise on photographic
evidence, declared in 1942 that photographic evidence constituted a significant part of the proof
in "nearly half of today's cases." CHARLES SCOTT, PHOTOGRAPHIC EVIDENCE § 1 (1942). Scott,
however, provides no source to support this claim.
8. This term is borrowed from ALEXANDER WELSH, STRONG REPRESENTATIONS (1992).
Welsh uses the term specifically in relation to circumstantial evidence, which he finds to have
become an especially significant mode of proof in the eighteenth century, both in literature and
in law. To a certain extent, I want to use the term in the same way that Welsh does: to denote
evidence that brings about emphatic conviction or belief. For Welsh, however, "strong represen-
tations" are explicitly circumstantial and unseen rather than visual; they make a "claim to know
many things without anyone's having seen them at all." Id. at 9.
9. See, e.g., James A. Sprowl, Evaluating the Credibility of Computer-Generated Evidence,
52 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 547 (1976); Adam T. Berkoff, Comment, Computer Simulations in
Litigation: Are Television Generation Jurors Being Misled?, 77 MARQ. L. REV. 829 (1994); Mario
Borelli, Note, The Computer as Advocate: An Approach to Computer Generated Displays in the
Courtroom, 71 IND. L.J. 439 (1996); Jennifer Robinson Boyle, Note and Comment, State v.
Pierce: Will Florida Courts Ride the Wave of the Future and Allow Computer Animations in
Criminal Trials?, 19 NOVA L. REV. 371 (1994); Karen Martin Cambell, Note, Roll-
Tape-Admissibility of Videotape Evidence in the Courtroom, 26 MEMPHIS ST. U. L. REV. 1445
(1996); Elaine M. Chaney, Note, Computer Simulations: How They Can Be Used at Trial and
the Arguments for Admissibility, 19 IND. L. REV. 735 (1986); David B. Hennes, Comment,
Manufacturing Evidence for Trial: The Prejudicial Implications of Videotaped Crime Scene
Reenactments, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 2125 (1994); Joseph M. Herlihy, Note, Beyond Words: The
Evidentiary Status of "Day-in-the Life" Films, 66 B.U. L. REV. 133 (1986); Gregory T. Jones,
Note, Lex, Lies & Videotape, 18 U. ARK. LITrLE ROCK L.J. 613 (1996); Jane Kalinski, Note,
Jurors at the Movies: Day-in-the-Life Videos as Effective Evidentiary Tool or Unfairly Prejudicial
Device?, 27 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 789 (1993); Evelyn D. Kousoubris, Comment, Computer
Animation: Creativity in the Courtroom, 14 TEMP. ENVrL. L & TECH. J. 257 (1995); Benjamin
V. Madison III, Note, Seeing Can Be Deceiving: Photographic Evidence in a Visual Age-How
Much Weight Does It Deserve?, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 705 (1984); Craig Murphy, Note,
Computer Simulations and Video Re-Enactments: Fact, Fantasy and Admission Standards, 17
OHIO N.U. L. REV. 145 (1990); Barry Sullivan, Comment, Computer-Generated Re-enactments
as Evidence in Accident Cases, 3 HIGH TECH. L.J. 193 (1989).
10. See, e.g., John H. Anderson, Jr., Admissibility of Photographs as Evidence, 7 N.C. L.
REV. 443 (1929) (arguing that a North Carolina case excluding a photograph as substantive
evidence was incorrectly decided); Dillard S. Gardner, The Camera Goes to Court, 24 N.C. L.
REV. 233 (1946) (stating that photographs properly taken are "the very highest type of
evidence" and suggesting that those courts that limit photographs to "illustrative" uses are
mistaken); James McNeal, Silent Witness Evidence in Relation to the Illustrative Evidence
Foundation, 37 OKLA. L. REV. 219 (1984) (positing that subject to an adequate foundation,
photographs should be allowed as "silent witnesses"); John E. Mouser & James T. Philbin,
Photographic Evidence-Is There a Recognized Basis for Admissibility?, 8 HASTINGS L.J. 310
(1957) (asserting that there is no generalizable and clearly defined basis for admissibility of
3
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sustained legal use, the history of photographic evidence remains
almost entirely untold."
This Article takes a close look at the early use of photographic
evidence in the American courtroom, providing a snapshot, if you
will, of the legal use of photography in the second half of the
nineteenth century. It reveals that photography was recognized,
almost from the time of its invention, as a potentially powerful
juridical tool-perhaps even a dangerously powerful tool. The
meaning and epistemological status of the photograph were intensely
contested, both inside and outside the courtroom. Furthermore, the
history of the legal use of photography is intimately intertwined with
the history of photographic technologies.12
Moreover, this Article argues that the judicial response to
photographic evidence helped to bring about broader changes in both
courtroom practice and the conceptualization of evidence. Super-
ficially, the legal use of photography steadily expanded: Within twenty
years of its invention, the new technology was employed as evidence
in courtroom settings, and by the turn of the century, photography
had become a routine evidentiary tool. But when we look more
closely at the tangled and contradictory ways in which photographs
were understood, the photograph's evidentiary status becomes both
more complex and more interesting.
In the second half of the nineteenth century, two competing
paradigms governed the understanding of the photograph. One
emphasized its ability to transcribe nature directly, while the other
highlighted the ways in which it was a human representation. From
the first perspective, the photograph was viewed as an especially
privileged kind of evidence; from the second perspective, the
photograph was seen as a potentially misleading form of proof.
Although there was often forceful support for photographs as
photographs); Steven I. Berger, Comment, "Silent Witness Theory" Adopted to Admit
Photographs Without Percipient Witness Testimony, 19 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 353 (1985)
(discussing increased use of "silent witness" theory of admissibility). For an interesting account
of the use of films as evidence in the Nuremberg trials, see Lawrence Douglas, Film as Witness:
Screening Nazi Concentration Camps Before the Nuremberg Tribunal, 105 YALE L.J. 449 (1995).
For a thorough, practical treatise on photographic evidence that includes a short historical
section, see ScoTT, supra note 7 (2d. ed. 1969).
11. A recently published commentary examined the use of photographs as attachments in
Supreme Court opinions. See Hampton Dellinger, Words Are Enough. The Troublesome Use of
Photographs, Maps, and Other Images in Supreme Court Opinions, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1704
(1997). Generally, however, nearly all of the best research to date on legal photography from
an historical perspective has been produced by art historians. See; e.g., JOHN TAGG, THE
BURDEN OF REPRESENTATION (1993) (analyzing legal photography from a Foucauldian
perspective); William Allen, The Spirit of Fact, 6 HIST. PHOTOGRAPHY 327 (1982) (describing
two early photographic evidence cases); Alan Sekula, The Body and the Archive, 36 OcTOBER
3 (1986) (analyzing criminality, phrenology, and photography).
12. See infra notes 19-52 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 10: 1
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evidence, both in the cases and in the periodical literature, there was
also grave concern about this novel form of proof. The doctrine that
emerged from this marriage of enthusiasm and unease was a peculiar
one, a precarious balancing act not wholly internally consistent. By
linking photographs analogically to maps, models, and drawings, this
new doctrine invented a pedigree for the new technology. Through
the use of analogy, judges gave the photograph a history.13
The doctrine that developed to govern the admissibility of
photographs resulted in the reconceptualization and invigoration of
an entire category of evidentiary representations, ushering in a
"culture of construction" in the courtroom. In the 1850s and before,
legal evidence usually consisted of words-spoken testimony, written
depositions, contracts, deeds, and the like. Those few images present
in court were often those that had received explicit legal sanction,
such as county-approved maps and surveys in land dispute cases, or
drawings and diagrams in patent cases. When unofficial drawings were
used, they were not thought to be evidence. Only with the advent of
photography were these broader kinds of visual representations
conceptualized as evidence, their evidentiary value deemed significant
enough to be fought over, their improper inclusion or exclusion
deemed worthy grounds for appeal. Indeed, by the end of the century,
the use of visual evidence had blossomed, and images of many sorts,
from photographs to diagrams to three-dimensional models, were fre-
quently used in an effort to persuade the jury. Visual representation,
not limited to photography, had become a significant persuasive
technique in the courtroom. Now, an attorney or witness could not
only locate evidence, but could create it himself. He could represent
his side of the story with an elaborate visual image prepared
especially for the lawsuit. These forms of visual evidence were
especially persuasive because jurors and judges could see the evidence
for themselves. To put it crudely, judicial response to the photograph
brought into existence that category of proof we now know as
"demonstrative evidence."14 This Article suggests that understanding
this "origin story" turns demonstrative evidence into a more
comprehensible and a more interesting legal category than is generally
recognized.
Finally, this Article endeavors to provide a case study of the
processes through which new technologies are brought into the
courtroom. With ever-increasing frequency, judges are required to
make legal sense of new technological forms. In the process, judges
13. See infra Section III.C.
14. See infra Section W.D.
1998]
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often must determine whether or not they can appropriately analogize
a new technology-such as electronic mail or DNA profiling or
computer simulations-to an already existing one, and, if so, which
one. Moreover, given the frequency with which judges do assimilate
new technologies through the use of analogies, it seems worthwhile to
inquire into the extent to which these analogies matter, and the extent
to which they genuinely end up controlling legal understandings of the
new technological form. Taking a detailed glance backwards to see
how judges assimilated a significant new technology in the second half
of the nineteenth century reveals the consequences of the judicially
made analogy that linked the photograph to other evidentiary forms.
And in this instance, although the analogy judges invoked certainly
did affect legal uses and understandings of the photograph, it did not
eradicate alternative (and contradictory) understandings.
In the case of photography, the analogy through which judges made
sense of the new technology served several purposes. To a certain
extent, the photograph's offer of verisimilitude was threatening;
indeed, in its strongest form, the photograph threatened to make the
factfinding portion of a trial redundant by providing the facts in an
incontestable form. The analogy, therefore, provided judges with a
form of domestication, a way to tame the new technology by linking
it to already existing representational forms, like maps, models, and
diagrams. Judges constructed an evidential category containing all of
these representational forms as elements. The judicially constructed
doctrine defused the institutional challenge posed by the photograph
by disempowering the photographic image through the claim that, like
a painting or diagram, it was mere illustration.
But this analogy had some unintended consequences. At a formal
level, the photograph was indeed tamed. As evidence, it operated like
a hand-drawn picture, as merely a visual appendage to someone's
testimony. It was neither self-proving nor necessarily true and
therefore threatened neither the judge's power to regulate evidence
nor the jury's province of factfinding. But practically, the domes-
tication was only partially successful, and the new technology
operated as proof as well as illustration. In the process, the outlines
of a new evidentiary category-what would later be called
demonstrative evidence--came into being. Judges attempted to
accommodate the new technology by pronouncing it an iteration of
an existing phenomenon, but this assertion ended up transforming the
preexisting categories to a significant degree. Although this back-and-
forth process of accommodation and transformation may not
represent a uniform model for the legal system's incorporation of new
technologies as evidence, the case of photography offers a useful and
significant instance. We can see, concretely, how the act of domes-
[Vol. 10: 1
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tication can bring about a transformation and how dramatic change
can be wrought out of the very effort to accommodate new tech-
nologies without change. A study of the photograph, therefore, lets us
see the process of common law change in action. Though there has
been a resurgence of scholarly interest in the study of legal analogies
in recent years, there have been no detailed case studies of their
operation in practice.15 This Article elaborates both the power and
the limits of analogic reasoning as a judicial strategy for coping with
novelty.
Part I provides a brief overview of the use of photographic evidence
in the nineteenth-century American courtroom, emphasizing the
connections between technological changes and legal uses. Part II
examines the kaleidoscopic understandings of the meaning of
photographic evidence both inside and outside of the courtroom,
showing how these mechanically generated images were simultaneous-
ly viewed as offering privileged access to truth and as potentially
misleading and manipulable. It focuses on one legal setting in
particular: spirit photographer William H. Mumler's preliminary
hearing for fraud, which turned into a significant public forum for the
exploration of the meaning of photographic evidence. Part III looks
at the doctrine that emerged to govern photographic evidence and
examines the tensions between the doctrine and actual practice. Part
IV shows that this doctrine helped to bring about an expanded
category of visual evidence in the courtroom. Part V offers some
thoughts on the significance of this case study in understanding the
judicial response to new technologies and the role of analogic
reasoning as a judicial response to innovation.
I. USES OF PHOTOGRAPHIC EVIDENCE
Louis-Jacques Mand6 Daguerre's 1839 invention of a way to fix
images permanently onto a silver-coated copper plate caused tremen-
dous excitement on both sides of the Atlantic. By the middle of the
1850s, Americans of all classes had sat for portraits, whether at a
sumptuous and elegant photographic salon or in the makeshift studio
of an itinerant photographer. 6 By the 1860s, the widespread ap-
preciation of paper photographs, inexpensive tin types, photographic
calling cards (known as cartes de visites), and three-dimensional
15. For the most interesting recent work on legal analogies, see Scott Brewer, Exemplary
Reasoning: Semantics, Pragmatics, and the Rational Force of Legal Argument by Analogy, 109
HARV. L. REV. 925 (1996); and Cass Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV.
741 (1993). For the classic treatment of "case-by-case reasoning," see EDWARD H. LEVI, AN
INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (1949).
16. See ROBERT TAFT, PHOTOGRAPHY AND THE AMERICAN SCENE 46-49, 76 (1938).
1998]
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stereoscopic images had brought a thriving photographic industry into
existence.17 The subjects scrutinized by the camera were nearly
unlimited: bourgeois ladies with bits of rouge hand-colored on the
photographic plate; the dismal realities of the battlefield; America's
natural wonders, from the Natural Bridge to Yellowstone; presidents
and paupers. It seemed as if the whole world had become fodder for
the photographer." Nor was the display of photographs limited to
family albums, photo galleries, and front parlors; rather, photographs
made their way into government reports, rogues' galleries, and even
the courtroom.
The use of photography in the courtroom is necessarily linked with
the history of photographic technologies. 9 Until the early 1850s, the
daguerreotype was the dominant photographic form. Daguerreotypes
were produced directly onto silver-coated copper plates. They were
not made from negatives and, therefore, were unique images-the
only way to reproduce a daguerreotype was to take a daguerreotype
of it. While this technology produced images of tremendous precision,
daguerreotypes could be viewed only straight-on; from an oblique
angle, the surface was reflective, like a mirror.2 Moreover, daguer-
reotypes were relatively expensive, especially in larger sizes. Although
these factors certainly placed limits on its evidentiary utility, the
daguerreotype might have been employed in the courtroom
nonetheless. Indeed, in 1852 an American photographic journal
reported that in France, "the lawyers are using daguerreotypes as a
means of convincing the judge and jury more eloquent than their
words., 21 It also described an accident in which the victim's lawyer
had used "pictures taken upon the spot, which from their reality,
17. See id. at 140-44, 160-64, 181-85; see also HELMUT GERNSHEIM & ALISON GERNSHEIM,
A CONCISE HISTORY OF PHOTOGRAPHY 116-19 (1965) (describing the "carte de visite craze" and
how photography was no longer "an art for the privileged" but "the art for the millions");
BEAUMONT NEWHALL, THE HISTORY OF PHOTOGRAPHY FROM 1839 TO THE PRESENT DAY
49 (1976) (noting the rise of "cheap" tintypes and "mass production" carte de visite).
18. See generally GERNSHEIM & GERNSHEIM, supra note 17, at 97-190 (describing the great
variety of photographic depictions); NEWHALL, supra note 17, at 47-80 (describing the rise of
portrait photography, art photography, war photography, and survey photography); TAFT, supra
note 16, at 186-88, 248-76 (describing the great variety of photographic topics recorded in the
1860s, ranging from the first aerial shots taken from a balloon to images of natural wonders and
the American frontier); ALAN TRACHTENBERG, READING AMERICAN PHOTOGRAPHS 21-164
(1989) (analyzing Matthew Brady's portrait photography and war photography and T.H.
O'Sullivan's survey images).
19. For the history of photographic technologies, see REESE JENKINS, IMAGES AND
ENTERPRISE: TECHNOLOGY AND THE AMERICAN PHOTOGRAPHIC INDUSTRY 36-41 (1975); and
TAFT, supra note 16.
20. For histories of the daguerreotype, see M. SUSAN BARGER, THE DAGUERREOTYPE:
NINETEENTH-CENTURY TECHNOLOGY AND MODERN SCIENCE (1991); and BEAUMONT
NEWHALL, THE DAGUERREOTYPE IN AMERICA (1961). For a cultural history of the daguer-
reotype, see RICHARD RUDISILL, MIRROR IMAGE: THE INFLUENCE OF THE DAGUERREOTYPE
ON AMERICAN SOCIETY (1971).
21. 4 HUMPHREY'S J. 175, 175 (1852).
[Vol. 10: 1
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explained the whole affair more lucidly than all the oratory of a
Cicero or a Demosthenes."22 But in the United States, no appellate
cases record the use of daguerreotypes for evidentiary purposes, and
neither is there evidence in the photographic or legal periodical
literature of their use in trials. Moreover, the subsequent coverage of
legal uses of photography in the photographic press suggests its
novelty. It is likely, therefore, that photographic images were rarely
used in the American courtroom before the end of the 1850s.
In the early 1850s, a new paper photographic process was invented.
The key innovation was a new collodion carrier that adhered to glass
plates that functioned as photographic negatives. From these
negatives, positive paper prints could be developed. Using this new
process, multiple prints could be made from a single negative. The
collodion process also quickly lowered costs.' By the late 1850s, the
process was in general use, and the spread of the innovation coincided
with the first uses of photography as evidence in the American
courtroom. In many of these earliest cases, photography entered the
courtroom with little fanfare; we often know that a photograph was
used only through an offhand reference. For example, in an 1857 case
in which the boundaries of a land grant were in dispute, the district
judge remarked of a particular oak tree: "The photograph exhibited
in court shows that its size and isolated situation are such as to strike
the eye and arrest the attention of the most casual observer."'24 As
this case wended its way through the legal system (it reached the
Supreme Court three separate times), photographs continued to
provide visual evidence of what the land looked like. Indeed, in the
third Supreme Court hearing of the case, the Justices gazed upon
seven photographic images that accompanied the deposition of
photographer William Shew. Shew described the vantage points from
which he had taken his images, and attested that "they are correct
representations of the appearances of the country as far as they can
be represented by photographic views. '
22. Id Charles Scott also mentions that unspecified newspaper accounts claimed an
extremely early use of the daguerreotype for legal purposes when a husband "succeeded in
photographing his wife during a tryst without being discovered and winning a divorce when the
daguerreotype was presented as evidence." Scorr, supra note 7, § 1A, at 2 (2d ed. 1969). This
story, however, is not at all credible. In 1839, cameras were simply too large and exposure times
too long to be used without detection. Indeed, surreptitious photographs were not taken easily
until the 1880s. See infra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
23. See JENKINS, supra note 19, at 36-41; NEWHALL, supra note 17, at 47-50.
24. United States v. Fossat, 25 F. Cas. 1157, 1159 (C.C.N.D. Cal.) (No. 15,137), rev'd on
other grounds, 61 U.S. (19 How.) 413 (1857).
25. Deposition of William Shew, Transcript of Record, Fossat v. United States, 1864 (Case
No. 4206, RG 267.3.2, National Archives, Washington, D.C.); see also The Fossat or Quicksilver
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In an 1859 land grant case in which the authenticity of the grant
was at issue, photographic copies of a Mexican governor's official seal
were used on appeal to the Supreme Court. Both the originals and
the photographic copies had been before the trial court, but the
photographs offered one distinct advantage over the originals: They
allowed a number of different seals to be placed side by side on a
single surface, so that indisputably authentic exemplars could easily
be compared to the suspected forgery.26 On appeal, only the photo-
graphic copies were used. The Justices noted, "We have ourselves
been able to compare these signatures by means of photographic
copies, and fully concur (from evidence 'oculis subjecta fidelibus') that
the seal and signatures are. . . forgeries."'27
In another case heard the same year, photographic copies of land
grants and signatures were also used.2 The practice of using
photographs to compare multiple exemplars was not limited to the
federal courts. In 1860, well-known photographer Albert S. South-
worth displayed to a Massachusetts jury photographs of enlarged
handwriting samples. The case involved a promissory note on which
the defendant claimed his signature had been forged. Southworth
testified for the plaintiff as an expert witness, using the
photographically magnified signatures to show why he believed the
handwriting to be genuine. After the jury found for the plaintiff, the
defendant appealed, based in part on the admission of the
photographic evidence. This case, Marcy v. Barnes, marked the first
time that the use of photographic evidence was the explicit subject of
an appeal.29 The defendant argued:
The photograph specimens of the note in suit and of the
admitted genuine handwriting of Barnes, made by the
photographer, were not admissible and should not have been
allowed to go to the Jury... [T]his is comparing it with a mag-
nified picture or representation of it, if it may not rather be
26. See Transcript of Record, Luco v. United States, 1859 (Case No. 3776, RG 267.3.2,
National Archives, Washington D.C.); see also Luco v. United States, 64 U.S. (22 How.) 515
(1859). Several authors have erroneously stated that the photographic copies were used only on
appeal in Luco, and not in the trial court. See Scorr, supra note 7, § 1B, at 2-3 (2d ed. 1969);
Allen, supra note 11, at 330. In fact, both the copies and the originals were used in the court
below, but only the copies were sent to the Supreme Court.
27. Luco, 64 U.S. (22 How.) at 541.
28. See Fuentes v. United States, 63 U.S. (21 How.) 443 (1859).
29. Marcy v. Barnes, 82 Mass. (16 Gray) 161 (1860). Note, however, that this case did not
mark the first time that Southworth had used photographic specimens in court. In an address
before the National Photographic Association, Southworth claimed credit for "the idea of
photographic disputed or questioned handwriting as an aid to its identification and authorship,"
and said that such photographs came to be used in the courts of Massachusetts, by his
introduction, around 1857. ALBERT S. SOUTHWORTH, AN ADDRESS TO THE NATIONAL
PHOTOGRAPHIC ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES, JUNE 1870, reprinted in 2 ANTHONY'S
PHOTOGRAPHIC BULL 343, 346 (1871).
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called a caricature of it. This is an attempt to engraft a new
principle upon this branch of the law of evidence. 0
The plaintiff claimed that photographic enlargements were merely
equivalent to viewing the specimens through a magnifying glass, and
that the jury would have been allowed to examine the specimens in
this way. l Although the court found for the plaintiffs on other
grounds, it entirely agreed with the defense's argument.32 The court
held: "Under proper precautions in relation to the preliminary proof
as to the exactness and accuracy of the copies produced by the art of
the photographer, we are unable to perceive any valid objection to
the use of such prepared representations."33
Over the next two decades, photographs were used in a variety of
legal contexts. Photographs of places described the terrain and the
exteriors of buildings in a land dispute case,'4 and interior images of
a whiskey distillery were used to impeach defense witnesses in a
revenue case."5 Photographs illustrated the scene of an accident."
Photographic copies of documents and enlargements of signatures
continued to be used and, in at least one case, enlargements of
corpuscles of blood were used in an effort to distinguish human blood
from animal blood.37 By the 1870s, photographs were frequently used
in criminal cases to prove identity, either of the victim or of the
defendant. 8
Although photographs were common enough for one commentator
to assert in 1871 that, "as a witness in the courts of justice,
photography is constantly employed in detecting forgery, revealing
perjury, and in telling the truth,, 39 photographs in the courtroom
30. Defendant's Brief, Trial Records, Marcy v. Barnes, 1860 (Supreme Judicial Court
Records, Social Law Library, Boston, Mass.).
31. See id.
32. See Marcy, 82 Mass. (16 Gray) at 163.
33. Id.
34. See 14 HUMPHREY'S J. 277 (1863).
35. See Photography in Court, 6 PHILA. PHOTOGRAPHER 322 (1869). The defense attempted
to offer a photographic view of the premises in Hollenbeck v. Rowley, 90 Mass. (8 Allen) 473
(1864), but it was rejected by the trial judge.
36. See Blair v. Pelham, 118 Mass. 420 (1875); Trial Records, Blair v. Pelham, 1875 (Supreme
Judicial Court Records, Social Law Library, Boston, Mass.); Photography in Court, 4 PHILA.
PHOTOGRAPHER 160 (1867).
37. See Photography a Detector of Crime, 15 HUMPHREY'S J. 289 (1864).
38. For the routine and uncontested use of photographs for purposes of establishing identity,
see, for example, THE TRIAL OF DANIEL MCFARLAND FOR THE SHOOTING OF ALBERT D.
RIcHARDSON 35,88 (New York, W.E. Hilton 1870); and THE TRIAL OF EMIL LOWENSTEIN FOR
THE MURDER OF JOHN D. WESTON 135-36, 140 (Albany, William Gould & Son 1874). For cases
in which objections were raised to the use of photographs to establish identity, see, for example,
Luke v. Calhoun County, 52 Ala. 115 (1875); Ruloffs Case, 11 Abb. Pr. (n.s.) 245 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1871); Udderzook v. Commonwealth, 76 Pa. 340 (1874); and THE GOSS-UDDERZOOK TRAGEDY:
BEING A STRANGE CASE OF DECEPTION AND MURDER (Baltimore, Baltimore Gazette 1873).
39. Some of the Modern Appliances of Photography, 1 PHOTOGRAPHIC TIMES 33,34 (1871).
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were still rare enough for the photographic journals to note their use
as something of a novelty. Until the 1880s, photographic techniques
required that pictures be developed immediately upon exposure-if
the collodion dried before development, the image would be ruined.
Moreover, producing a photograph still required a high degree of
skill. Taking outdoor photographs in particular required substantial
advance preparation; a photographer literally had to carry his
darkroom with him to the site and set it up prior to exposing the
plate.' It is not surprising, therefore, that in this period, studio-made
photographs-such as copies of documents and portraits of victims
and defendants-were seen more frequently in the courtroom than
exterior images. Copies of documents were easily taken in any
photography studio. And by the 1870s, many-if not
most-Americans had sat for a photographic portrait, so it was a
simple-enough matter, logistically, to use these extant photographs in
the courtroom."
In the early part of the 1880s, however, the diffusion of a new
photographic technology transformed the industry. After several
decades of trying to create a stable dry plate for photographs,
photographers and inventors succeeded at the end of the 1870s. This
innovation meant that photographers no longer had to develop their
images immediately; rather, they could take pictures out-of-doors and
away from their studios and develop them upon their return. By the
early 1880s, photographers could buy high-quality dry plates, and by
the middle of the 1880s, photographers could send their plates to the
Eastman Company for developing, printing, and enlarging.42 Taking
basic photographs, therefore, came to require far less skill; no longer
did the image-taker need to know how to develop the negative or
print the image, much less how to coat the photographic plate himself.
Amateur photography began to flourish, and article after article
described the anxiety engendered by roving photographers-"that
rapidly increasing class of persons known as amateur instantaneous
photograph cranks"-who threatened to make a permanent record of
any instant.43 It had even become possible for a photograph to be
40. See, e.g., JENKINS, supra note 19, at 39 (noting that "the field photographer needed to
be both technically oriented and also sufficiently muscular to bear the burden of his apparatus
and small laboratory").
41. See RUDISILL, supra note 20; TAFT, supra note 16; see also A Voice from the West, 4
PILA. PHOTOGRAPHER 15 (1867) (complaining that photographers would soon be out of work
because "it cannot be denied that the great mass of the people in this country have had their
pictures taken").
42. See JENKINS, supra note 19, at 109-12.
43. That Horrid Camera, PHOTOGRAPHIC EYE, AND THE EYE, Jan. 17, 1885, at 7, 7
(reprinted from S.F. POST); see also The Amateur Photography Craze, PHOTOGRAPHIC EYE,
AND THE EYE, June 20, 1885, at 8 (reprinted from JUDGE) (describing how roving
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taken without the subject's knowledge.' Reports began to circulate
of people "caught in the act" by the camera, and incriminating
photographs made their way into the courtroom, especially in breach
of promise and divorce suits in which the faithlessness of a fiancee or
a spouse was captured vividly by a photograph.45 More generally, the
greater ease and increased flexibility brought about by dry-plate tech-
nology-and not long thereafter, by the advent of roll film-meant
that photographs became more common in a variety of legal contexts.
By the end of the nineteenth century, photographs were routinely
used in the courtroom, though judges had declared that this form of
evidence could be used only for illustrative purposes, rather than as
independent proof.' Despite this limitation, judges and juries
examined enlarged exemplars of handwriting, eyed photographs to
gauge resemblance in bastardy cases,47 saw photographs of property
damage, sometimes even comparing images taken "before" and
"after,"" stared at images of victims as well as defendants,49 gazed
upon scenes of crimes and sites of accidents, ° and scrutinized
photographers may capture more than they bargained for); The Obtrusive Amateur,
PHOTOGRAPIC EYE, AND THE EYE, Dec. 9, 1885, at 9, 9 (reprinted from EXCHANGE)
(recommending that the "remedy for the amateur photographer" is "to put a brick through his
camera whenever you suspect that he has taken you unawares."). For the role that amateur
photography played in constructing a legal right to privacy, see Samuel D. Warren & Louis D.
Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193, 195 (1890) (suggesting that
"[i]nstantaneous photographs and newspaper enterprise have invaded the sacred precincts of
private and domestic life" and have spurred the need for greater legal protection of the right
"to be let alone").
44. See, eg., The Camera in Court, PHOTOGRAPHIC EYE, AND THE EYE, Oct. 17, 1885, at
3 (showing the use of surreptitiously taken photographs in a nuisance suit); Photographed on the
Fly, THE PHOTOoRAPHiC EYE, AND THE EYE, Jan. 10, 1885, at 6 (describing a hidden camera
used by a detective photographer to take pictures without the subject's knowledge).
45. See The Amateur Photography Craze, supra note 43, at 8 (describing the potential for
incriminating photographs to bring about divorce); Ada S. Bailin, Photographic Bye-Paths,
PHOTOGRAPICu EYE, AND THE EYE, Apr. 18, 1885, at 2, 2 (describing an "amusing instance"
in which instantaneous photography captured the image of a wife with another man); That
Horrid Camera, supra note 43 (describing a case in which a suspicious fianc6 surreptitiously took
an image of his betrothed).
46. Estimating with any precision the frequency with which photographs were used is a near-
impossible task. By the end of the 1880s, however, the discussions of the legal uses of
photography in the photographic press and the legal periodical literature make it clear that it
had become common.
47. See In re Jessup, 22 P. 742 (Cal. 1889); Farrell v. Weitz, 35 N.E. 783 (Mass. 1894).
48. See, e.g., McGar v. Borough of Bristol, 42 A. 1000 (Conn. 1899); German Theological
Sch. v. Dubuque, 17 N.W. 153 (Iowa 1883); Dorsey v. Habersack, 35 A. 96 (Md. 1896); Verran
v. Baird, 22 N.E. 630 (Mass. 1889); Roosevelt Hosp. v. New York Elevated R.R., 21 N.Y.S. 205
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1892); Cozzens v. Higgens, 33 How. Pr. 439 (N.Y. 1869).
49. See, e.g., Malachi v. State, 8 So. 104 (Ala. 1890); Commonwealth v. Morgan, 34 N.E. 458
(Mass. 1893); Commonwealth v. Campbell, 30 N.E. 72 (Mass. 1892); Stiasny v. Metropolitan St.
Ry., 65 N.E. 1122 (N.Y. 1902); People v. Webster, 34 N.E. 730 (N.Y. 1893); People v. Smith, 24
N.E. 852 (N.Y. 1890); Commonwealth v. Connors, 27 A. 366 (Pa. 1893).
50. See, e.g., People v. Phelan, 56 P. 424 (Cal. 1899); Dyson v. New York & N.E.R.R., 17
A. 137 (Conn. 1888); Wabash v. Jenkins, 84 Ill. App. 511 (1899); Chicago & A.R.R. v. Myers,
86 Il. App. 401 (1894); Cleveland, C.C. & St. L. Ry. v. Monaghan, 41 111. App. 498 (1891);
Keyes v. State, 23 N.E. 1097 (Ind. 1889); Locke v. Sioux City & P.R.R., 46 Iowa 109 (1877);
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pictures of wounds." The photograph had become a significant
evidentiary tool.52
II. MEANINGS OF PHOTOGRAPHIC EVIDENCE
But what did the photograph mean as evidence? How was it
understood and interpreted, both within legal settings and more
generally? In this Section, I explore the complex question of the
photograph's evidentiary power. Many viewed the photograph as an
unmediated replication of nature and hence, as an especially
privileged evidentiary form. Others, however, thought the photograph
a form of artifice: manipulable, partial, and potentially misleading.
How, then, were judges to interpret photographs in legal settings? In
order to address these questions, I first look at the two paradigms for
understanding the photograph in their most extreme forms, and then
detail one of the earliest high-profile legal settings in which the
meaning of the photograph as evidence was explicitly at issue. This
case, in which a well-known spirit photographer was charged with
fraud for selling ghostly images to the public, represents a moment in
which the contradictory cultural understandings of the photograph
were put to the test in the courtroom, a moment when not only
judges and lawyers but the population at large reflected on just what
kind of knowledge could be gleaned by peering at a photograph.
A. A Mirror with Memory
In 1859, a photograph provided the key to solving a dramatic
murder. This was literally a dramatic murder, a murder that took
place within a play; and the guilty man was caught in the act by a
camera. As the jury calls for "[p]roof, proof," one character notices
a photographic plate sticking awkwardly out of a smashed camera.
Although a Native American was on the verge of being condemned
for the crime, the camera reveals the guilty party: Jacob M'Closky,
the man who had called most vociferously for the other's lynching,
stared out from the plate, captured by the camera's lens in the
moment of the murder. The following exchange ensues:
State v. Hersom, 38 A. 160 (Me. 1897); Archer v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 13 N.E. 318 (N.Y.
1887); Hampton v. Norfolk W.R.R., 27 S.E. 96 (N.C. 1897).
51. See, e.g., Franklin v. State, 69 Ga. 36 (1882); Reddin v. Gates, 2 N.W. 1079 (Iowa 1879);
Cooper v. St. Paul City Ry., 56 N.W. 42 (Minn. 1893); Albierti v. New York, L.E. & W.R.R.,
23 N.E. 35 (N.Y. 1889); People v. Fish, 26 N.E. 319 (N.Y. 1891); Cirello v. Metropolitan Express
Co., 88 N.Y.S. 932 (App. Term 1904).
52. It is worth noting that the dynamic we see in the case of the photograph-unreflective
acceptance, followed by a certain wariness about the power of a new form of evidence,
ultimately resulting in a more cautious approach-is not exclusive to photography. A number
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Scudder. You! You slew him with that tomahawk; and as you
stood over his body with the letter in your hand, you thought
that no witness saw the deed, that no eye was on you-but there
was, Jacob M'Closky, there was. The eye of the Eternal was on
you-the blessed sun in heaven, that, looking down, struck upon
this plate the image of the dead. Here you are, in the very
attitude of your crime!
M'Closky. 'Tis false!
Scudder. 'Tis true! the apparatus can't lie. Look there, jurymen.
[Shows plate to jury.] Look there. 0, you wanted evidence-you
called for proof-Heaven has answered and convicted you.
M'Closky. What court of law would receive such evidence?
[Going.]
Ratts. Stop; this would. You called it yourself; you wanted to
make us murder that Injiun; and since we've got our hands in for
justice, we'll try it on you.53
Before turning to the theater of the courtroom, we shall pause in
this other theater to see what Dion Boucicault's play illustrates about
understandings of the nature of photographic evidence. This scene
from a often-performed drama by a major nineteenth-century
playwright reveals attitudes toward the photograph and its potential
as evidence that resonated well beyond the walls of the theaters in
which it was performed.
In Boucicault's play, the photographic apparatus serves as a deus ex
machina in a double sense. As a plot device, the camera is both
improbable and crucial: The image miraculously appears, just in time
to solve the murder and save an innocent man. But the camera also
operates as one of the most literal Gods-in-a-machine ever to grace
a stage. The camera is explicitly an agent of heaven, producing its
image without any earthly creature's intervention. No person works
the apparatus: It is the finger of God that operates the machine.
Indeed, Boucicault collapses God into the machine, setting up an
equivalence between the eye of the Eternal and the lens of the
camera. There is a point here beyond Boucicault's playfully literal
depiction of an ancient plot device. His rendering of the camera as a
self-acting machine, capable of producing images untainted by human
manipulation, reflects tropes common to cultural understandings of
photography in late nineteenth-century America.
In Boucicault's play, nature speaks directly-"the blessed sun"
strikes the image upon the plate without any human assistance. Of
course, no real camera could work in such a fashion; indeed, when the
53. DION BOUCICAULT, THE OcrOROON (1859), reprinted in EARLY AMERICAN DRAMA
449, 485-86 (Jeffrey H. Richards ed., 1997).
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play was first performed in 1859, the production of a photograph was
an elaborate matter requiring substantial human labor at every stage
from the preparation of the photographic plate to its development.-'
But in making the camera self-acting, Boucicault exploits the concep-
tion, popular at the time, that what was significant about the
photographic image was its mechanical provenance, its automatic
duplication of whatever lay before the lens. Boucicault's removal of
the human being from the process of making the photograph was a
fantasy, but it was a fantasy that resonated with popular perceptions
of what made the photographic image special. Many of the early
commentators on photography described the new process as if nature,
or the sun, were the active agent. Daguerre, the inventor of the first
photographic process, deemed his invention "not merely an
instrument which serves to draw Nature; on the contrary it is a
chemical and physical process which gives her the power to reproduce
herself."55 This kind of language, emphasizing that nature reproduced
herself in a photograph, was routinely invoked in descriptions of the
new technology.56 As one judge expressed it, photographs were
"light printed pictures produced by the operation of natural laws and
not by the hand of man."57 Boucicault's elimination of the human
operator merely extended the suppression of human agency, com-
monplace in discussions of photography's significance.
A consequence of viewing the photograph as nature copying nature
was an emphasis on photographic accuracy. The photograph was often
portrayed as a direct transcription, or, in Oliver Wendell Holmes's
colorful phrase, as "a mirror with a memory," and hence, as infinitely
faithful and precise.5 As a process borne of nature itself (with a bit
of chemical and mechanical assistance), the photograph seemed to
offer not merely a representation of reality, but a replication. Edgar
Allan Poe labeled it "truth itself in the supremeness of its perfec-
54. See, e.g., TAFT, supra note 16, at 207. For a satirical account of the difficulties a
photographer encountered in the making of an image, see The Total Depravity and Gymnastics
ofInanimate Things Photographic, 2 PHILA. PHOTOGRAPHER 165 (1865).
55. JACQUES LOUIS MANDt DAGUERRE, DAGUERREOTYPE (Paris, Pollet, Scoupe, &
Guillois 1839), reprinted in CLASSIC ESSAYS ON PHOTOGRAPHY 11, 13 (Alan Trachtenberg ed.,
1980).
56. See, e.g., New Discovery in the Fine Arts, NEW YORKER, Apr. 20, 1839 ("These living
pictures, by traversing lens and mirrors, are thrown down with double beauty on the table of the
camera obscura by the radiant finger of light."); New Discovery in the Fine Arts, NEW YORKER,
Apr. 13, 1839 [hereinafter New Discovery in the Fine Arts I] ("Talk no more of 'holding the
mirror up to nature'-she will hold it up to herself."); Nathanial Willis, The Pencil of Nature,
CORSAIR, Apr. 13, 1839, at 71 (declaring that with photography "all nature shall paint herself").
For secondary sources discussing this understanding of photography, see RUDISILL, supra note
20; and CAROL SCHLOSS, INVISIBLE LIGHT (1987).
57. Porter v. Buckley, 147 F. 140, 142-43 (3d Cir. 1906).
58. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Stereoscope and the Stereograph, 3 ATLANTIC MONTHLY
738 (1861), reprinted in CLASSIC ESSAYS ON PHOTOGRAPHY, supra note 55, at 71, 74.
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tion."59 In the inaugural volume of the Philadelphia Photographer,
one author described how the camera "sees everything and it
represents just what it sees. It has an eye that cannot be deceived and
a fidelity that cannot be corrupted."' If the photograph duplicated
nature in an unmediated way, then the truthfulness of such
duplications was an obvious corollary. Or, as Boucicault's character
put it, "the apparatus can't lie."61
In Boucicault's play, Ratts prevents M'Closky from leaving,
declaring that this fictional court would indeed accept the photograph
as evidence. If the photograph were fundamentally and necessarily
truthful, then the photograph's legitimacy as evidence followed
axiomatically. Indeed, many believed that the photograph simply was
evidence, proof in and of itself of what it represented. Early discus-
sions of photography revealed two aspects to this belief in the
photograph's evidentiary nature. First, numerous writers saw the
photograph as the representational--or perhaps even on-
tological-equivalent of whatever it displayed. As Oliver Wendell
Holmes wrote, tongue only partially in cheek, upon the advent of
photography: "Form is henceforth divorced from matter .... Give us
a few negatives of a thing worth seeing, taken from different points
of view, and that is all we want of it. Pull it down or burn it up, if you
please."62 If the photograph and its object were concomitant, then
surely the one could stand as evidence of the other. But we need not
merely infer this relation. A number of writers described the
photograph in explicitly evidentiary language. In a later article,
Holmes himself succinctly noted: "Tourists cannot be trusted;
stereographs can." 63 Lady Elizabeth Eastlake called photography
"the sworn witness of everything presented to her view," a medium
that could provide "facts of the most sterling and stubborn kind."'
Reverend Morton termed it "a witness on whose testimony the most
certain conclusions may be confidently founded., 65 Photographer
James Ryder said the camera records "truth itself."' Ryder went on
to say: "[W]hat [the camera] told me was as gospel. No misrepresen-
59. Edgar Allan Poe, The Daguerreotype, ALEXANDER'S WEEKLY MESSENGER, Jan. 15,
1840, at 2, reprinted in CLASSIc ESSAYS ON PHOTOGRAPHY, supra note 55, at 37, 38.
60. H.J. Morton, Photography as an Authority, 1 PHILA. PHOTOGRAPHER 180, 181 (1864).
61. BOUCICAULT, supra note 53, at 486.
62. Holmes, supra note 58, at 80; see also Poe, supra note 59, at 38 (describing the
photograph as having "a perfect identity of aspect with the thing represented").
63. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Sun-Painting and Sun-Sculpture, 8 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 13,22
(1861).
64. Lady Elizabeth Eastlake, Photography, 101 QUARTERLY REv. 442 (1857), reprinted in
CLASSIC ESSAYS ON PHOTOGRAPHY, supra note 55, at 39, 65.
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tations, no deceits, no equivocations. He saw the world without
prejudices; he looked upon humanity with an eye single for jus-
tice., 67 Using a vocabulary of evidence, writers emphasized the
photograph's capacity to prove facts and its trustworthiness as a
witness.
Judges and lawyers drew upon this understanding of photography
as automatic, and hence reliable and legitimate as evidence. As one
judge put it, regarding a photograph taken of an accident scene, "[a
photograph] is a picture of the place made automatically, the spot
being reflected as in a mirror, and the image chemically made
permanent.... The photograph brings the spot to the jury ... ; a
more correct and vivid idea being thus conveyed to the minds of the
jury than could be done by any language of witnesses .... ,,6 In
language less felicitous than Holmes's, a lawyer tried (unsuccessfully)
to persuade a judge to admit photographic copies of some documents
by analogizing photography to a mirror with memory. He wrote:
"Until photography was discovered, nothing in nature was exactly like
any other thing, except that thing's image reflected in a polished
surface, which disappeared when the object was removed.... Science
now steps forward and relieves the difficulty, by making permanent
and materializing with minute exactness the reflected image."69
Judges and lawyers reiterated the trope of photography as the
ultimate witness. One lawyer argued that "[t]he photograph is
something more than a copy; it is a fac simile, and it is a perfect
record of facts, not subject to prejudice, bias, or defective
memory."7 In his defense of photographic evidence, a Georgia
Supreme Court judge declared:
We cannot conceive of a more impartial and truthful witness than
the sun, as its light stamps and seals the similitude of the wound
on the photograph put before the jury; it would be more accurate
than the memory of witnesses, and as the object of all evidence
is to show the truth, why should not this dumb witness show
it?71
67. JAMES F. RYDER, VOIGHTLANDER AND I IN PuRsurr OF SHADOW CATCHING 16 (1902),
quoted in ScHLoss, supra note 56, at 18.
68. Hampton v. Norfolk & W.R.R., 27 S.E. 96, 97-98 (N.C. 1897) (Clarke, J., dissenting).
69. Ebom v. Zimpelman, 47 Tex. 503, 509 (1877) (argument of counsel); see also Kansas
City, M. & B.R.R. v. Smith, 8 So. 43, 44 (Ala. 1889) (calling a photograph "a scientific
reproduction of a fac simile of the original object in nature, by a mechanical art which is every
day advancing towards perfection").
70. Plaintiff's Brief, Trial Records, Verran v. Baird, 1889 (Supreme Judicial Court Records,
Social Law Library, Boston, Mass.); see also Verran v. Baird, 150 Mass. 141 (1889).
71. Franklin v. State, 69 Ga. 37, 43 (1882).
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By this view, the photograph was not merely evidence, but the best
kind of evidence imaginable: mechanical, automatic, and not subject
to those biases and foibles that may cloud human judgment.72
A second explicitly evidential conception of the photograph can be
seen in the extremely early recognition of its potential for capturing
criminals in the act. In one of the very first popular articles on the
subject written after Daguerre announced his invention in 1839, a
writer in the New Yorker mused: "What will become of the poor
thieves, when they shall see handed in as evidence against them their
own portraits, taken by the room in which they stole, and in the very
act of stealing!"73 A song that circulated in Britain shortly after the
daguerreotype's invention predicted:
The new Police Act will take down each fact
That occurs in its wide jurisdiction
And each beggar and thief in the boldest relief
Will be giving a color to fiction.74
A few years after Boucicault's play was published, a legal journal also
posited the view that this new technology could be used to expose
crime. An article suggested that when photographic techniques were
"perfected," all of the streets and alleys of cities should be swept by
surveillance cameras. The author hoped that these cameras would
capture images of anyone rioting or disturbing the peace, for use in
subsequent legal proceedings. 75
Boucicault's use of the camera invokes a constellation of related
ideas surrounding the photographic image: a belief that it is produced
by nature and science, an emphasis on its realism and truthfulness,
and a confidence in its authority as a witness. By this view, the
photograph was more than a representation; it was a transcription
capable of offering uniquely objective knowledge about the world. It
was not merely evidence, but the highest form of evidence: "0, you
wanted evidence-you called for proof-Heaven has answered and
convicted you. '76 The photograph, it would seem, was almost eviden-
tiary ambrosia. As a judge in an 1871 murder case wrote in defense
of the lower court's decision to admit two photographs of an alleged
murderer's co-conspirators who drowned fleeing the site of a burglary:
72. This understanding of photographic objectivity resonates to a considerable degree with
Daston and Galison's discussion of the moralized conception of objectivity developed by 19th-
century scientists. See generally Daston & Galison, supra note 3.
73. New Discovery in the Fine Arts I, supra note 56.
74. Quoted in HELMUT GERNSHEIM & ALISON GERNSHEIM, LJ.M. DAGUERRE 105 (1956)
(noting that the song was dedicated to "L.J.M. Daguerre Esquire of Photogenic Celebrity").
75. The Legal Purposes of Photography, 13 SOLIcrroRs' J. & REP. 425, 425 (1869).
76. BOUCICAULT, supra note 53, at 486.
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As well might we deny the use of the compass to the surveyor or
mariner, the mirror to the truthful reflection of images; or
spectacles to aid the failing sight, as to deny, in this day of
advanced science, the correctness ... to the photographic
instrument, in its power to produce likenesses.
77
It might thus seem that in legal settings a strong belief in
photographic accuracy and truthfulness would make the photograph's
evidentiary status unproblematic. However, the food of the Gods
might not sit well in the stomachs of mere mortals. The more
unquestionably accurate and truthful the process of photography, the
more threatening photography might seem to factfinders and the
judicial process. Notice that in Boucicault's play it is "Heaven" that
has "answered and convicted." What need is there for judge or jury
in the face of heaven's evidence? If photographs are indeed perfect
representations, could they not obviate the need for a trial altogether,
or at least determine its outcome? In the play, the photograph solves
the case-it is not just a piece of evidence or a link in a causal chain.
It is the determining evidence, evidence so strong that it renders any
trial merely an unfolding of the inevitable.
But for all of the authority granted to the photograph in the play,
not all of the characters presume its infallibility. When the photograph
is first revealed, M'Closky, caught in the act by the all-seeing eye of
the camera, asks dismissively, "[w]hat court of law would accept such
evidence?"78 In the context of the play, this question is no more than
a last-ditch effort to escape fate made by a desperate and guilty man.
But from a cultural perspective, this question is not so absurd. When
the play was first performed, the photograph's evidentiary status in
the courtroom was still uncertain. Moreover, as we shall see in Part
III, the doctrine developed to govern the admissibility of photographic
evidence would not have allowed Boucicault's self-acting camera
image into the courtroom at all, even had it been a technological
possibility.
B. "A Most Dangerous Perjurer"
Existing alongside the strong realist understanding of the
photograph as objective, machine-made truth was another constel-
lation of attitudes toward these new kinds of images. Emphasizing the
inherent distortions of photography, the human agency involved in
77. Ruloff's Case, 10 Abb. Pr. (n.s.) 245, 290-91 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1871); see also Beardslee v.
Columbia Township, 41 A. 617 (Pa. 1898) ("Photographs are competent evidence, and when
properly taken are judicially recognized as of a high order of accuracy.").
78. BOUCICAULT, supra note 53, at 486.
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producing images, or the possibility of outright manipulation, some
commentators highlighted the myriad ways in which the photograph
was not simply the literal truth, perfectly rendered.
Photographs were necessarily imperfect representations, some
authors insisted, because the photographic process itself inevitably
produced distortions. Numerous photographers pointed out the ways
in which the focal length of the lens affected the image.79 As one
author noted:
I need do no more than call to your minds the exaggerations in
perspective which are most glaring in architectural subjects taken
with a short-focus, wide-angle lens. I do so ... to point out that
the position claimed for photography as an infallible exponent of
literal truth is quite untenable.'0
Those who focused on the technical ways in which photographs
distorted their subjects generally saw the final product as mildly
exaggerated, but not downright false--or, as one commentator put it,
"not absolute truth, only adumbrations thereof."' Judges, however,
occasionally saw the potential distortions of photography as significant
enough to warrant its exclusion from the courtroom. For example, in
an 1871 New York probate case in which photographic reproductions
and enlargements of handwriting were at issue, the judge determined:
Too many collateral issues are involved to render
[photographs] reliable testimony... The refractive power of the
lens, the angle at which the original to be copied was inclined to
the sensitive plate, the accuracy of the focusing, the skill of the
operator, and the method of procedure, would have to be
79. See, e.g., W.J. Baker, A Case of Photographic Distortion, 1871 PHOTOGRAPHIC MOSAICS
31; George Croughton, Photographic vs. Literal Truth, 3 ANTHONY'S PHOTOGRAPHIC BULL. 40,
41 (1872); M. Figueier, Influence of Photography Upon the Fine Arts, 2 HUMPHREY'S J. 371,372
(1851) (reprinted from AMERICAN ART-UNION).
80. Croughton, supra note 79, at 41. Attorneys occasionally argued that the photograph was
an inadequate substitute for the witness's own vision. For example, in Scott v. City of New
Orleans, 75 F. 373 (5th Cir. 1896), a tort suit involving a sidewalk accident, the plaintiff's lawyer
argued that even if the obstruction looked obvious in the photograph, it may not have looked
obvious to a real-life person walking down the street. He pointed out that a photograph can
reveal on an ancient manuscript "mysteries of inscription absolutely unsuspected by the eye" or
"pustules of smallpox" on a face that looks entirely smooth to the human observer. Id at 378.
He continued:
How irrational, therefore, to measure the human eye by the same criteria of judgment that
we measure the camera; and hence how unjust to hold the retina to the same capacity of
imaging, and to imaging with the same depth of shadows and shades.., that the
photograph is held to.... All that a man can be held to a responsibility for seeing,
therefore, in respect to any particular object brought within his field of vision, is the image
the object makes on his retina, and not the image it makes on the vastly more sensitized
plate of the camera.
Id.
81. Baker, supra note 79, at 33.
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investigated to ensure the evidence as certain. The court would
be obliged... to inquire into the whole science of photography.
When we reflect that by placing the original to be copied
obliquely to the sensitive plate, the portion nearest to the plate
may be distorted by being enlarged, and that the portion furthest
from the plate must be correspondingly decreased, while the
slightest bulging of the paper upon which the signature is printed
may make a part blurred, and not sharply defined, we can form
some idea of the fallacies to which this subject is liable.'
Others emphasized that it was only through the careful
manipulations of the photographic operator that inaccuracies could be
prevented:
We often hear from admirers of Photography that this young
art represents the pure truth, the true counterpart of nature.
This sentence is repeated by thousands of thoughtless persons,
and has almost become a dogma. We are willing to swear to the
correctness of photographic representations, and even the courts
of justice have admitted them as evidence.
But is the correctness of photographic representations really
absolute? I venture to say no, even at the risk of being called a
heretic.8 3
So declared Dr. H. Vogel in the Philadelphia Photographer in 1869.
He went on to describe the complexities of proper lighting; those
instances in which a decent photograph could be achieved only by
retouching the negative; and finally, the distortions that resulted from
rendering natural colors in shades of gray. Vogel granted that
photographs could be made accurate, but insisted that "[i]t constitutes
the art of photography to present the reality true and beautiful. '8 4
Photographers, not surprisingly, often decried the perception that
photographs were made automatically, asserting instead that human
agency was essential to the photographic process. Indeed, the
photographic press criticized Boucicault for his play's self-acting
camera:
Our notions of photography hitherto have been, that it has been
necessary, in order to take a photograph, that an operator who
knows a little should prepare a plate, and pose the person, and
develope [sic] it .... Really, Mr. Boucicault, you must think
people are indeed ignorant of photography and its processes, if
82. The Taylor Will Case, 10 Abb. Pr. (n.s.) 300, 319 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1871); see also Geer v.
Missouri Lumber & Mining Co., 34 S.W. 1099, 1101 (Mo. 1896).
83. H. Vogel, Photography and Truth, 6 PHILA. PHOTOGRAPHER 262, 262 (1869).
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you think they can accept... [your] process as genuine
photography."
Photographers emphasized that well-constructed photographs resulted
not from the miraculous automatism of the machinery, but through
the expertise, skill, and artistic values of the photographer:
It is thought that photography is simply chemical and mechanical;
that it goes with a crank, like a grindstone; that any man who
owns a camera and possesses the secret of dark-room
manipulations is a photographic artist. A landscape painter said
to me, "Photographers have the same instruments and use the
same chemicals, do they not? What, then, prevents one man from
making as good pictures as another?.. ." I replied, "You knights
of the brush all use the same canvas, and brushes, and paints;
why does one man's work have greater value than another?"
"That answers me," he said; "but it never occurred to me before
that the photographer had much to do with it." This prejudice is
very deeply rooted in the minds of the community. 6
Emphasizing the significance of human agency and skill simul-
taneously highlighted the fact that the photograph was not a
replication but a representation, a constructed-and hence fal-
lible-image: "[I]t is no exaggeration to say that an artist and
practised manipulator combined can do with the pencil of light pretty
much the same as a painter who works with his brush and badger sof-
tener ... a photograph is not necessarily a faithful portrait. '
Judges frequently defended the admissibility of photographs by
invoking this analogy to painting, which emphasized the photograph's
fallibility. As one judge reasoned:
That a portrait or a miniature, painted from life and proved to
resemble the person, may be used to identify him cannot be
doubted, though, like all other evidences of identity, it is open to
disproof or doubt.... There seems to be no reason why a
photograph, proved to be taken from life and to resemble the
85. Theatrical Photography-The Octoroon, 7 PHOTOGRAPHIC J. 339, 340 (1861); see also
Photography, 9 PHOTOGRAPHIC J. 137, 138 (1864) (reprinted from QUARTERLY REV.) (noting
that in The Octoroon "[t]he author apparently entertained the view that.., a camera and lens
would take a picture of what passed before them, without the intervention of any sort of human
agency").
86. J. L. Hurd, Photographic Portraits vs. Camera Pictures, PHOTOGRAPHIC EYE, AND THE
EYE, Aug. 29, 1885, at 5, 5-6; see also H.J. Morton, The Trials of the Photographer, 2 PHILA.
PHOTOGRAPHER 36 (1865) (describing the difficulties that can plague even highly skilled
photographers); The Total Depravity and Gymnastics of Inanimate Things Photographic, supra
note 54 (humorously illustrating the tremendous difficulties the photographer must overcome
simply to produce an accurate likeness).
87. Judicial Photography, 15 PHOTOGRAPHIC J. 107, 107 (1872).
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person photographed, should not fill the same measure of
evidence.'
The judge's commentary both justified admitting the photograph and
diminished its value. If a photograph were admissible because it was
like a painting, photographs were themselves "open to disproof or
doubt."89 A New York case decided a few years later made this
point more explicitly. Chief Judge Charles J. Folger, in Cowley v.
People, argued that a photograph was not, at root, different from any
other kind of testimony.'° No more than a painting or a written
deposition did a photograph necessarily recount truth, but like these
other types of evidence, the photograph might be a true representa-
tion.
Most of evidence is but the signs of things. Spoken words and
written words are symbols.... So the signs of the portrait and
the photograph, if authenticated by other testimony, may give
truthful representations. When shown by such testimony to be
correct resemblances of a person, we see not why they may not
be shown to the triers of the facts, not as conclusive, but as aids
in determining the matter in issue, still being open like other
proofs of identity or similar matters, to rebuttal or doubt. A
witness who speaks to personal appearance or identity, tells in
more or less detail the minutia thereof as taken in by his eye.
What he says is a description thereof, by one mode of signs, by
words orally uttered. If his testimony be written instead of
spoken, and is offered as a deposition, it is a description in
another mode of signs, by words written; and the value of that
mode, the deposition, depends upon the accuracy with which his
words uttered are put into words written. Now if he has before
him a portrait or a photograph of the person, and it shows to him
a correct copy of that person, if it produce to his view a correct
description, which he testifies is a likeness, why may not that be
given to the jury, as a description of the person by the witness in
another mode of signs? The portrait and photograph may err, and
so may the witness. That is an infirmity to which all human
testimony is lamentably liable.91
88. Udderzook v. Commonwealth, 76 Pa. 340, 352 (1874); see also Luke v. Calhoun County,
52 Ala. 115, 117 (1875) (recognizing a photograph as "evidence of the same character as a
portrait or miniature").
89. Udderzook, 76 Pa. at 352.
90. See Cowley v. People, 83 N.Y. 464 (1881).
91. Cowley, 83 N.Y. at 478-79 (emphasis added). A similar argument was proffered in an
1864 British case, in which a judge admitted a photograph, declaring it "only a visible
representation of the image or impression made upon the minds of the witnesses . .. ; and,
therefore is, in reality, only another species of the evidence which persons give of identity when
they speak merely from memory." Reg. v. Tolson, 4 F. & F. 103, 104 (Cr. Ct. 1864). Other cases
analogizing a photograph to a word-picture include People v. Webster, 34 N.E. 730 (N.Y. 1893);
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The judge's reasoning explicitly described the photograph as a human
construction; he debunked the myth of the self-operating camera, the
direct transmission to the photographic plate. By labeling the
photograph as just another form of human testimony, the judge
validated its use only by dethroning it.
In Cowley, the judge's reasoning was based quite explicitly on a
two-step analogy. First, the judge deemed portraits and photographs
structurally equivalent. The judge never referred to the photograph
by itself, but invariably discussed both portrait and photograph.'
Though in contemporary parlance, photographic portraits were
sometimes simply called portraits, the judge's double references to the
portrait and the photograph suggest that the portraits that he had in
mind were not photographic ones. Instead, his language suggests that
photographic and nonphotographic images provide the same kind and
quality of evidence-that is, both provide descriptions of a witness's
testimony through visual rather than verbal signs. Strictly speaking,
the judge did not analogize the portrait to the photograph; rather, he
presumed their equivalence. The second step of his argument is an
explicit analogy: The judge reasoned that these kinds of visual depic-
tions are relevantly similar to oral human testimony about a person's
appearance. The portrait, the photograph, and verbal testimony all
provide descriptions, made by a witness, through one or another form
of communication, or "mode of signs."'93 By making this analogy, the
judge suggested that visual depictions are as legitimate a form of
evidence as oral utterances. But he also suggested that visual
evidence, like its oral counterpart, has its limits. Neither of these
forms is conclusive, and each shares the risk of fallibility.
I have drawn particular attention to the form of analogical
reasoning used in Cowley, because this oft-cited case provides a strong
exemplar of the general doctrine regarding the admissibility of
photographs that had begun to stabilize at the time of this opinion.
Like Judge Folger, judges generally made sense of the photograph
through analogy. The approach to photographic evidence that came
to dominate judicial understanding differed slightly from Cowley's
reasoning because it often rested upon one step of the two-step
analogy, merely analogizing photographs to other kinds of visual
evidence rather than explicitly analogizing all of these forms of visual
depiction to verbal testimony more generally. But this alternative
approach had the same effect as Cowley's two-step comparison: It
and Schaible v. Washington Life Ins. Co., 9 Phila. 136 (D. Ct. 1873).
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emphasized that the photograph, like other kinds of visual evidence,
was merely a witness's description in visual form rather than indepen-
dent, substantive evidence. Part III explores this dominant legal
approach to photographic evidence in more detail.
It must be noted, however, that the rhetorical move exemplified by
Cowley-equating the photograph with other descriptive forms, visual
or verbal-risked, ironically, making the use of photographic evidence
altogether suspect. If the photograph was properly understood as
equivalent to any other form of human testimony, then the
widespread belief in inherent photographic certainty might make the
legal use of this new technology highly misleading. An anonymous
article, published originally in the Photographic News and reprinted
in several legal journals, made exactly this argument, pointing out that
it was precisely the photograph's reputation for truthfulness that
risked making it "a most dangerous perjurer."'94 The author
bemoaned "the general notion that a photograph must be, without
question, an almost ideal of truthfulness," when in fact, "the
photograph may be made to speak for this or for that, according as
the finger of mammon does point," through the use of particular
lenses, careful positioning, and other technical and logistical
maneuvers.95 To those who believed the photograph to be at once
highly manipulable and held in high regard, it was dangerous evidence
indeed.
Concern that photographs were liable to manipulation echoed in
other quarters as well. For example, photographer Henry Peach
Robinson engendered a good deal of controversy with his "combina-
tion" photographs that represented scenes that had never actually
existed:
In his finished picture he contrives to put together objects which
are not together before the lens. Each individual object in the
picture is delineated from nature by the sun; but the collocation
is purely arbitrary.... There is no doubt that Mr. Robinson has
produced some very beautiful pictures by this ingenious and
laborious process; but his success has not prevented an energetic
controversy both as to the legitimacy of the plan and its artistic
value.96
Robinson himself advocated mixing "the real and the artificial in a
picture," arguing that "[i]t is not the fact of reality that is required,
but the truth of imitation .... Cultivated minds do not require to
94. The Photograph as a False Witness, 10 VA. L.J. 644, 645-46 (1886) (reprinted in IRISH
L. TIMES and CENTRAL L.J.; originally published in PHOTOGRAPHIC NEWS).
95. Id.
96. Photography, 9 PHOTOGRAPHIC J. 137, 143 (1864) (reprinted from QUARTERLY REV.).
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believe that they are deceived, and that they look on actual nature,
when they behold a pictorial representation of it."'97 But even
Robinson expressed concern that boundaries between deception and
reality be preserved, that impossible combinations be avoided (like
the head of Napoleon III on an eagle that an eager reader of
Humphrey's Journal hoped to construct98), and that deceptions be
stated as such.9 9 In practice, however, the boundary lines between
realism and illusionism, deception and reality, and truth and
manipulation were not always clearly marked.
C. Photographic Spirits and the Problem of Photographic Evidence
One of the earliest cases in which the photograph's legal status and
meaning were explicitly at issue was a hearing before the Court of
Special Sessions in New York City in 1869. Photographer William H.
Mumler was charged with fraud for the production of "spirit"
photographs, images that seemed to show hazy, ghostlike figures
looming in the background (see Figure 1). Although Mumler's ap-
pearance before Judge Dowling was merely a preliminary hearing to
assess whether there was sufficient evidence to send the case to a
grand jury, the seven days of testimony and argument sparked the
public's imagination. Though nearly forgotten now, the case received
substantial attention in newspapers in New York and elsewhere, as
well as in both photographic journals and those devoted to
spiritualism. One newspaper reported:
The intensity of the interest manifested by the public in this case
has perhaps never been surpassed in reference to any criminal
investigation in this city, and yesterday, as on all previous
hearings, the Court was densely thronged with anxious listeners,
all of whom gave a critical and scrutinizing attention to the
testimony elicited, and were evidently deeply engrossed with the
mysterious nature of its details.1"
In 1861, a London journal had lightheartedly suggested: "[W]e will
believe even in the modern ghost if it can be fixed on paper.""1 1
Shortly thereafter, across the Atlantic, a jewelry engraver in Boston
seemed to take up the challenge. At the time, Mumler worked as an
97. H.P. ROBINSON, PICTORIAL EFFECT IN PHOTOGRAPHY 109 (London, Piper & Carter
1869), cited in MILES ORVELL, THE REAL THING 82 (1995).
98. See Letter to the Editor, 16 HUMPHREY'S J. 47 (1864).
99. See ORVELL, supra note 97, at 82.
100. Spiritualism in Court, N.Y. DAILY TRIB., Apr. 24, 1869, at 4.
101. Photographs of Ghosts, 5 PHOTOGRAPHIC NEWS 526 (1861), cited in Jennifer Tucker,
Science Illustrated: Photographic Evidence and Social Practice in England (1996) (unpublished
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engraver at the Boston jewelers of Biglowe Brothers & Kennard, and
by his own admission was "a complete novice in the art of
photography."" ° He would, on occasion, visit a friend employed in
a photographic gallery, and one Sunday, while experimenting with his
friend's photographic equipment, he attempted to take a self-portrait.
Although Mumler avowed that when he took the photograph "there
was not a living soul in the room" besides himself, upon developing
the image he discovered a second, indistinct form next to his own.l
He experimented further, and continued to find spirit
"extras"-shadowy ghosts that appeared alongside the sitter-in his
photographic portraits." Soon, Mumler devoted himself full time
to the production of spirit photographs. For a certain period, he
reaped acclaim and financial gain from his new profession. He
received testimonials and endorsements from satisfied cus-
tomers-among them "a number of the shrewdest business and
literary men"l°-who often recognized the ghostlike figures on the
photographs as deceased relatives or acquaintances. Several skeptical
Boston photographers investigated Mumler's methods, but despite
following him step-by-step through the creation of an image, they
found no evidence of manipulation or fraud. °6 Tales of Mumler's
miraculous photographs traversed the United States and Europe; they
were received with skepticism by photographic journals and glee by
spiritualist ones."° But in 1863, the same ghost appeared on two
102. Spiritualism in Court, N.Y. DAILY TRIB., May 4, 1869, at 2 (testimony of William H.
Mumler).
103. Spirit Photographs-A New and Interesting Development, 8 PHOTOGRAPHIC J. 214
(1863) [hereinafter Spirit Photographs 1] (reprinted from SPIRITUAL MAG. and HERALD OF
PROGRESS).
104. By Mumler's own account, his first spirit photograph appeared in 1861, and this is the
date that generally has been repeated in later accounts of spirit photography. See JAMES
COATES, PHOTOGRAPHING THE INVISIBLE at x (1911); SIR ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, THE
HISTORY OF SPIRITUALISM 128 (1926). However, a close look at the photographic literature
suggests that the original photograph was produced a year later- Many of the articles describing
Mumler's photographs appeared early in 1863 and date Mumler's first photograph as having
been from several months earlier. See, e.g., C.B. Boyle, Photographing Spirits, HUMPHREY'S J.,
Apr. 15, 1869, at 307; Spirit Photographs I, supra note 103, at 214.
105. Boyle, supra note 104, at 307.
106. See Report of the Photographic Section of the American Institute, 6 ANTHONY'S
PHOTOGRAPHIC BULL 119 (1875); Spirit Photographs-A New and Interesting Development, 8
PHOTOGRAPHIC J. 324 (1863) [hereinafter Spirit Photographs IlI] (reprinted from SPIRITUAL
MAGAZINE and HERALD OF PROGRESS); Spirit Photographs-A New and Interesting
Development, 8 PHOTOGRAPHIC J. 268 (1863) [hereinafter Spirit Photographs I1] (reprinted from
SPIRITUAL MAGAZINE and HERALD OF PROGRESS); Spirit Photographs I, supra note 103; see
also DOYLE, supra note 104, at 130-32; Boyle, supra note 104, at 307; Mrs. Henry Sidgwick, On
Spirit Photographs, 7 SOC'Y FOR PSYCHICAL RES. 168 supp. (1891-92).
107. For the suspicion with which Mumler's photographs were received in England, see
Tucker, supra note 101, at 32-33. Mumler's photographs were praised in articles in Spiritual
Magazine in 1862 and 1863. For the skeptical reception of the photographic press in France, see
Photographic Spirits, 14 HUMPHREY'S J. 312, 312 (1863) (quoting Moniteur de la Photographie
which calls Mumler's images "a new farce").
28




William Mumler, Master Herrod in a trance. His spiritual body withdrawn & appears
behind. Albumen print photograph, carte de visite format (approx. 2 /4" x 4" overall),
circa 1868. Win. B. Becker Collection. Photo: Michael. Sarnacki, New City Communi-
cations.
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separate photographs Mumler had taken-and the supposed ghost was
found to be a Boston resident who was still very much alive. 8 Even
his supporters were convinced that these particular photographs
resulted from deception on Mumler's part, and skeptics saw them as
proof positive that Mumler's spirit photographs were a sham.
In 1868, Mumler moved to New York City and began once again
to peddle his spirit photographs. But in April, 1869, he was arrested
for fraud and brought before the Court of Special Sessions at the
Tombs Police Court for a preliminary hearing. The prosecution
accused Mumler of selling his photographs under false pretenses by
claiming that they represented otherworldly apparitions when in fact
they were the product of fakery and manipulation. A central issue in
the case was the validity of spiritualism and its relation to the burden
of proof Was it the defense's obligation to prove that the
photographs were actually produced by spiritual means, or did the
prosecution have the burden of proving that they were produced
mechanically? A critical subtext in the hearing was the nature of the
photograph. Just how manipulable were photographs? Were the
photographs themselves proof that Mumler was in touch with the
spirit world, or were they prima facie evidence of his deceit? What
did photographs mean as evidence, and how ought they to be
interpreted? For Mumler's supporters, the photographs provided
compelling and objective proof of the existence of ghosts-they were
"real pictures of real spirits,"'" a literal rendition of shadows into
substance. As one spiritualist put it, "[t]he pictures themselves furnish
evidence in their gauze-like appearance, that has not been
imitated."'' 0 But for those members of "the class of doubting
Thomases" who "[did] not believe in spirits," Mumler's photographs
offered evidence of nothing-except, perhaps, the ease with which
photographs could deceive the unwary."' The preliminary hearing
offered the chance to place on trial not only William Mumler, but the
nature of photographic evidence itself.
Mumler was charged with two felonies and a misdemeanor: fraud
by false pretenses, cheating under the common law definition, and
larceny by trick and device." 2 Over a three-week period, testimony
and argument were presented before Judge Dowling."' The first
108. See DOYLE, supra note 104, at 132-33.
109. Spirit Photographs 111, supra note 106, at 325 (quoting A.B. Child, a Boston
photographer who investigated Mumler in 1863).
110. Spirit Photographs II, supra note 106, at 268 (quoting Dr. Gardner's address to the
Boston Spiritual Conference).
111. Photographic Spirits, supra note 107, at 312.
112. See THE MUMLER "SPIRIT" PHOTOGRAPH CASE, ARGUMENT OF MR. ELBRIDGE T.
GERRY 5-7 (1869) [hereinafter GERRY, MUMLER ARGUMENT].
113. The New York press covered the case in detail. For a day-by-day summary, see Alleged
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witness was New York City's Chief Marshal, Joseph H. Tooker, who
testified that in the course of investigating allegations of Mumler's
fraud, he had visited the studio under a false name and asked for a
spirit photograph, hoping to find his deceased father-in-law's presence
upon his photographic portrait. According to Tooker, his own image
was accurate enough, but "the likeness of the father-in-law was a most
dismal failure; and although spectral and ghostly enough to have been
a veritable emanation from the spirit land, bore not a ghost of a
resemblance to the deceased gentleman" 114-nor, for that matter, to
anyone else known by Tooker, living or dead. Tooker also testified
that Mumler had asserted that he was a spiritual medium, that the
photographs were produced by supernatural means, and that
throughout the picture-taking process, Mumler had steered the
conversation in a direction designed to lead Tooker to "confound the





After Tooker's testimony, the defense presented several
photographers who testified that they had visited Mumler with the
intention of discovering the means by which he produced his images.
As one New York City photographer affirmed, "although I went
prepared to scrutinize everything, I could find nothing which savored
of fraud or trickery.""' 6 Other witnesses were satisfied customers
who testified that Mumler had produced, as promised, remarkable
spirit photographs of their deceased kin (see Figure 2). One identified
the image "instantaneously" as an "unmistakable" likeness of his
deceased wife;..7 others described how their children, friends and
neighbors had confirmed the spirit's resemblance to a dear depart-
ed. 1 8
The most distinguished defense witness was undoubtedly John
Worth Edmonds, a prominent attorney and former judge who had sat
on several New York courts, including the court of appeals. Judge
Edmonds displayed to Judge Dowling two photographs that Mumler
Photographic Swindle, N.Y. DAILY TRIB., Apr. 13, 1869, at 8; The Spiritualist Photograph
Swindle, N.Y. DAILY TRIB., Apr. 17, 1869, at 4; Spiritualism in Court, N.Y. DAILY TRIB., Apr.
22, 1869, at 2; Spiritualism in Court, N.Y. DAILY TRIB., Apr. 24, 1869, at 4; N.Y. DAILY TRIB.,
Apr. 24, 1869, at 6; Spiritualism in Court, N.Y. DAILY TRIB., Apr. 27, 1869, at 2; N.Y. DAILY
TRIB., Apr. 27, 1869, at 4; Spiritualism in Court, N.Y. DAILY TRIB., Apr. 29, 1869, at 2; Fayette
R. Gridley, Are They Pictures of Spirits?, N.Y. DAILY TRIB., Apr. 30, 1869, at 2; Spiritualism in
Court, N.Y. DAILY TRIB., May 4, 1869, at 2.
114. Alleged Photographic Swindle, N.Y. DAILY TRm., Apr. 13, 1869, at 8; see also
Spiritualism in Court, N.Y. DAILY TRIB., Apr. 22, 1869, at 2.
115. Alleged Photographic Swindle, N.Y. DAILY TRIB., Apr. 13, 1869, at 8.
116. Spiritualism in Court, N.Y. DAILY TRIB., Apr. 22, 1869, at 2.
117. Spiritualism in Court, N.Y. DAILY TRIB., Apr. 24, 1869, at 4 (testimony of Charles F.
Livermore).
118. See id. (testimony of Paul Bremond, David Hopkins, and Samuel R. Fanshaw).
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had recently taken of him; in the upper-right-hand corner of each
appeared "a dim outline of a female face." '119 Judge Edmonds was
a leading spiritualist who had published a book on the topic in
1853,1 and he admitted on the stand that he believed in principle
"that the camera can take a photograph of a spirit., 121 Nevertheless,
he avoided making any positive pronouncement about the validity of
Mumler's photographs in particular, instead advocating a cautious,
"wait and see" approach." Still, Edmonds's presence as a witness
for the defense reminds us that, in 1869, belief in spiritualism, and
belief in spirit photographs, crossed boundaries of class and profes-
sional attainment. 2 3
After the defense rested, the prosecution called additional
witnesses, including well-known members of the photographic
establishment who testified in detail about the numerous mechanisms
and sleight-of-hand tricks through which ghostlike images could be
produced on a photograph. The prosecution also called PT. Barnum,
who told the court that he had corresponded with Mumler some years
earlier and had purchased several of Mumler's photographs for
display in his museum, though he emphasized that he had never
proclaimed them to be authentic spirit photographs. Barnum testified
that he was convinced that Mumler's images were nothing but a hum-
bug-and that he ought to know, "hav[ing] devoted a portion of [his]
life to the detection of humbugs.""
But colorful and well-known witnesses like Barnum and Edmonds
are, for our purposes, merely sideshows. Our central concerns with
this trial are the interpretation of the photographs themselves, what
the images were seen to prove, and how they were thought about as
119. Spiritualism in Court, N.Y. DAILY TRiB., Apr. 22, 1869, at 2 (testimony of Judge John
Worth Edmonds).
120. See 6 DIcrIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 23 (Allen Johnson & Dumas Malone
eds., 1931).
121. Spiritualism in Court, N.Y. DAILY TRIB., Apr. 22, 1869, at 2 (testimony of Judge
Edmonds).
122. Id. Judge Edmonds justified his caution by explaining that "many years ago [I] made
up my mind never to form an opinion without knowledge; invariably, when I have done so, I
have made an ass of myself." Id. In the view of those skeptical of spiritualism, he may have
proceeded to do just that when he recounted in detail a personal encounter with a spirit a few
days earlier: In a courtroom in Brooklyn, while a life insurance case was under consideration,
a spirit appeared before Edmonds and told him that the claimants ought not to collect on the
policy, since he, the spirit, had committed suicide. Elbridge Gerry, the prosecutor, intimated on
cross-examination that Edmonds was the unfortunate victim of hallucinations. See id.
123. Arthur Conan Doyle was another committed spiritualist, and spirit photography was
central to his belief. Doyle thought that the existence of spirit photographs provided compelling
evidence of the existence of ghosts. For extensive discussions of spiritualism in nineteenth-
century England and America, see, for example, ANN BRAUDE, RADICAL SPIRrrs (1989);
DOYLE, supra note 104, at 30-170; and ALEX OWEN, THE DARKENED ROOM (1990).
124. Spiritualism in Court, N.Y. DAILY TRIB., Apr. 29, 1869, at 2 (testimony of P.T.
Barnum).
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William Mumler, Mrs. Conant of Banner of Light Her brother, Charles H. Crowell.
Albumen print photograph, carte de visite format (approx. 2 4" x 4" overall), circa
1868. Wm. B. Becker Collection. Photo: Michael Sarnacki, New City Communica-
tions.
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evidence. In the testimony and arguments of the Mumler case we can
tease out three distinct stances toward the significance of Mumler's
photographs as evidence. First, some of the defense witnesses'
testimony rested upon a strong version of photographic realism, but
a realism disconnected from its mechanical underpinnings. Second, the
prosecution and its witnesses combined an emphasis on photography's
mechanical provenance with a focus on its manipulability. Although
these two groups understood the photograph's evidentiary meaning
in diametrically opposed ways, they shared an understanding of the
photograph as evidence; that is, each group viewed the photographs
themselves as providing evidence of something important to the case.
By contrast, the lawyers for the defense endeavored to empty the
photograph of evidentiary significance altogether, arguing that the
photographs themselves simply did not constitute evidence.
1. Supernatural Realism
Several of the witnesses for the defense understood the photograph
in fundamentally realist terms. They believed in the accuracy of the
image depicted on the photograph precisely because it was depicted
on a photograph. For example, William Silver, a New York
photographer who rented Mumler his studio and equipment, started
out as a skeptic but was transformed by the photographs into a
believer, if not in spiritualism, at least in the authenticity of Mumler's
images. During cross-examination, after Silver denied being a
spiritualist, Elbridge Gerry asked him, "You do not become a convert
to spiritualism notwithstanding all these forms?" Silver responded: "I
believe in the picture; I believe the impressions produced are
produced by spiritual means."'125 Silver believed in the picture; the
photographs themselves compelled his conviction. But the dominant
justification for the photograph's authority, its capacity to duplicate
precisely and mechanically that which lay before the eye, was not
precisely Silver's justification. The spirits on the photographs had not
been seen by any person in the room; clearly, the photograph did not
merely reproduce what the eye could see. The photographs resulted
not from mechanical replication, but from supernatural intervention.
Even thus dislodged from a completely mechanical foundation, the
photograph remained authoritative for Silver; we might, therefore, call
his attitude "supernatural realism."
Another witness, Luthera Reeves, revealed a similar attitude in
even starker form:
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Q: Do you believe deceased persons revisit their friends?
A: I cannot say; I believe so by the pictures.
Q: Did you entertain belief in Spiritualism previous to the
production of these pictures?
A: I did not.
Q: From these pictures you believe in supernatural powers?
A: Yes."26
For Reeves and Silver, the photographs themselves provided the
critical evidence for the existence of spirits; the images compelled
their belief. To a certain extent, Reeves and Silver were the inheritors
of the attitude portrayed in Boucicault's play. They seemed to believe
that "the apparatus can't lie," even when its depictions were most
unearthly.27 Boucicault's characters invoked God and heaven as
photographic agents; in a similar fashion, Reeves and Silver believed
that heavenly manifestations on the photographic plate provided
material evidence of the spiritual. Though in this sense their
photographic epistemology directly paralleled that of The Octoroon,
their understanding deviated from the broader tradition in which The
Octoroon was situated. In the prototypical nineteenth-century
understanding of the photograph as authoritative, its incontrovert-
ibility stemmed from its literal transcriptive power, its operation as a
"mirror with memory."" Those witnesses in Mumler's trial who
deemed the pictures proof of spirits severed this link between
photographic authority and unmediated replication. They believed in
photographic truth even when the image showed more than the eye
alone could verify as true.
2. Mechanical illusionism
The prosecution and many of its witnesses understood the
photographs in strikingly different terms from those of the "supernat-
ural realists." Instead of viewing the images as proof positive of the
presence of spirits, they saw them as per se proof of fraud. Although
not described explicitly in such terms, the prosecution's case can be
characterized as based on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur-the thing
speaks for itself-as if the photographs in and of themselves bespoke
the trickery that must necessarily have accompanied their cre-
ation. 29 Some of the witnesses simply assumed the impossibility of
126. Spiritualism in Court, N.Y. DAILY TRm., Apr. 24, 1869, at 4 (testimony of Luthera
Reeves).
127. BOUCICAULT, supra note 53, at 486.
128. Holmes, supra note 58, at 74.
129. Strictly speaking, the fraud with which Mumler was accused stemmed not from the
photographs' creation, but from his sale of them as authentic spirit photographs. But since
Mumler admitted that he had sold the pictures and that he had claimed that they were authentic
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genuine spirit photographs; ergo, Mumler's spirit photographs could
not possibly be genuine. As Charles Boyle, a well-established
photographer and member of the American Institute, testified, "I say
these pictures of Mumler's are not spiritual pictures." "Why?" asked
Mr. Townsend, one of Mumler's lawyers. "I believe two and two
make four," responded Boyle.13° In Boyle's estimation, Mumler's
photographs was an obvious truth, as incontestable as arithmetic.
But Boyle did not base his skepticism solely on the self-evident
impossibility of spirit photographs. Rather, he and several other
witnesses showed how the photographs themselves-not the mere fact
of their existence, but the specific details of their construc-
tion-proved that they were the work of artifice rather than the
Almighty. Boyle explained to the court that the shadows thrown by
the spirits in one of Mumler's photographs fell differently from those
thrown by the sitter, proving "therefore that it was impossible that the
spirit form could have been in the field of the camera with the sitter;
it clearly shows that it was taken from another picture. 1 31 Five
witnesses, each an amateur or professional photographer, showed how
Mumler's photographs violated basic rules of light and shadow."3
Abraham Bogardus said of one of the most egregious images, "[i]t is,
to speak emphatically, a transparent lie on its face, the shadow on the
sitter being on one side, and the shadow of the spirit on the other; it




By challenging the authority of Mumler's photographs, these
witnesses emphasized the manipulability of photographic images.
Indeed, the prosecution's case placed great emphasis on the myriad
ways that photographs could be manipulated to produce seemingly
ghostly results. Witness after witness described in detail these
different methods, which ranged from relatively simple practices like
exposing a single plate twice, to complex processes like the use of
microscopic lenses. Photographs, then, were not necessarily what they
seemed and could not automatically be relied on as truthful represen-
tations of reality. In this sense, the prosecution drew upon the
spirit photographs, the only fact at issue was whether or not the photographs were actually spirit
photographs.
130. Spiritualism in Court, N.Y DAILY TRIB., Apr. 29, 1869, at 2 (testimony of Charles B.
Boyle).
131. I&
132. See Spiritualism in Court, N.Y. DAILY TRIB., Apr. 29, 1869, at 2; Spiritualism in Court,
N.Y. DAILY TRIB., Apr. 27, 1869, at 2; Spiritualism in Court, N.Y. DAILY TRIB., Apr. 24, 1869,
at 4.
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understanding of photography as a fallible and untrustworthy human
construction, as a potential producer of illusions.
But the views of the photographers who testified for the
prosecution were, on the whole, more complex than this emphasis on
the manipulability of images suggests. In fact, these witnesses invoked
photographic manipulability not to dismantle photographic authority,
but to preserve it. Although they acknowledged the possibility of
photographic fakery, they were careful to define its limits and to
defuse its threat to the authority of photography by circumscribing its
boundaries. This delineation took place in three different ways.
First, as we have already seen, the photographers' testimony
showed how manipulation often left telltale traces on the photographs
themselves. This made manipulation substantially less problematic by
making it detectable. If the fake could be distinguished from the
authentic simply by looking closely, faked photographs could become
a trick, a parlor game, a curiosity. Just as forgery is threatening only
when counterfeit money can be made to look real enough to pass for
authentic currency,"3 fake photographs are not alarming unless
there is a risk that they might be confused with authentic ones. By
arguing that the fact of manipulation could be revealed through a
careful examination of light and shadow, photographers shored up
their own claims to expertise. After all, not just anyone could perceive
the subtle clues that revealed Mumler's photographs as manipulations;
only those who knew how to look properly would see the giveaway
signs. Therefore, photographers testifying for the prosecution freely
granted that photographic images could be manipulated, but em-
phasized that their expertise could expose fraudulent photographs for
what they were.
Second, even as photographers detailed the multiple ways in which
photographs could be constructed to reveal ghostly images, they
emphasized that photography was first and foremost a mechanical
process. As Asher G. Mason testified, "It was impossible that the
picture could have been taken by other than mechanical means."'
If invisible apparitions might come to light in the process of making
a photograph, the technology could never be relied upon for a secure
representation of what had been visible before the camera's lens. By
methodically describing and illustrating those purely mechanical
processes through which spirit photographs could be generated, the
134. In fact, the photograph prompted significant anxiety about forgery precisely because
it seemed to offer a way of making perfect copies of money.
135. Spiritualism in Court, N.Y. DAILY TRi. Apr. 29, 1869, at 2 (testimony of Asher G.
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photographers rationalized them and made them mundane. They tried
to show that photography was not a mystical, mysterious, or spiritual
process, but rather necessarily followed the laws of nature.136
Photography was ordinary, they declared-and hence reliable.
In Boucicault's play, the photograph was the pencil of God; more
generally, as we have seen, the photograph was seen to be the pencil
of nature. The photographers who testified at Mumler's hearing
wanted to oust God from the machine-or, in this instance, to
exorcise the ghost in the machine-and restore nature and mechanical
processes as the exclusive rulers of the photograph. The
photographers, then, were mechanical illusionists. They understood
that photographs might well produce illusions, but no recourse to the
supernatural was necessary to explain these illusions. Mechanical
processes alone would suffice.
A third and related way that the photographers attempted to retain
the authority of photographs despite the possibility of fakery was by
implicitly suggesting that manipulation was an active process.
Manipulated photographs did not simply occur. Rather, they required
careful preparation and active intervention on the part of the
photographer. All of the processes described by the prosecution's
witnesses required forethought and planning-the preparation in
advance of a positive image to be placed on the sensitive plate; the
insertion of a microscopic picture of a spirit; the use of an extra glass
slide with a spirit image on it; the double exposure of the plate.137
These processes were not happenstance; they occurred only through
dint of will on the part of the photographer. No witness testified
explicitly about the significance of this necessary labor. But the
elaborate descriptions and illustrations of the methods suggested that
although photographs could be faked, they could be faked only with
substantial effort. 38
Moreover, the photographers' testimony suggested that the
photographic community took seriously a commitment to expose
fakers and manipulators who presented their shenanigans as authentic.
Abraham Bogardus testified that he was connected with the National
Photographic Association, and that this organization had been formed
136. See GERRY, MUMLER ARGUMENT, supra note 112, at 32-38.
137. For descriptions of the various processes, see id. at 32-38; Spiritualism in Court, N.Y.
DAILY TRiB., Apr. 29, 1869, at 2; Spiritualism in Court, N.Y. DAILY TRIB., Apr. 27, 1869, at 2.
For a general description of methods of photographic fakery, see ALAIN JAUBERT, MAKING
PEOPLE DISAPPEAR: AN AMAZING CHRONICLE OF PHOTOGRAPHIC DECEPTION 9-14 (1986).
For a detailed discussion of photographic manipulation in the age of digital technology, see
generally WILLIAM J. MITCHELL, THE RECONFIGURED EYE (1992).
138. See GERRY, MUMLER ARGUMENT, supra note 112, at 32-38; Spiritualism in Court, N.Y.
DAILY TRiB., Apr. 29, 1869, at 2; Spiritualism in Court, N.Y. DAILY TRiB., Apr. 27, 1869, at 2;
Spiritualism in Court, N.Y. DAILY TRin., Apr. 24, 1869, at 4.
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"for protecting honest people in the trade from patents and for
putting down any humbug we could discover." '139 Putting down
humbugs was a boundary-patrolling activity."4° By unmasking fraud
and fakery, photographers aspired to retain their professional
credibility and that of their products. Indeed, after the Mumler trial
had concluded, the Photographic Section of The American Institute
passed a resolution denouncing Mumler: "Resolved, That the
Photographic Section of the American Institute take the earliest
opportunity to condemn all such methods of working upon the
credulous and uninitiated."'' 1 Though they might not be able to
prevent humbugs from plying their trade, photographers endeavored
to maintain the integrity of their practices by publicly condemning
charlatans.
The photographers' claim that only those with skill and experience
could delineate falsified photographs from authentic ones, could, in
theory, have had implications for the legal use of photographic
evidence. Specifically, it indicated a necessary role for the
photographer in any trial in which photographic evidence was at issue.
It suggested that photographs ought not to be allowed as legal
evidence unless they had been certified by a properly qualified
photographer as bearing no signs of manipulation. In several early
cases, judges implicitly accepted this logic, ruling that photographs
could be used only if the photographer himself testified about the
process through which he had made the image and personally attested
to its accuracy. 42 But judges did not adhere to this rule for long.
Over time, many had determined that the attesting witness need not
be the photographer himself, nor even a photographer at all, but
139. Spiritualism in Court, N.Y. DAILY TRIB., Apr. 24, 1869, at 4.
140. Boundary patrolling as a mechanism for asserting expertise and authority has recently
received a good deal of attention from sociologists of science. See, eg, STEVEN SHAPIN & SIMON
SCHAFFER, LEVIATHAN AND THE AIR PUMP 336-43 (1985) (describing the centrality of
boundary creation for bolstering the authority of early modem experimental scientists); Thomas
F. Gieryn, Boundary Work and the Demarcation of Science from Non-Science: Strains and
Interests in Professional Ideologies of Scientists, 48 AM. SOC. REV. 781 (1983) (describing how
construction of a boundary between science and nonscience is useful for scientists' pursuit of
professional goals); Sheila Jasanoff, Contested Boundaries in Policy-Relevant Science, 17 Soc.
STUD. SCI. 195 (1987) (examining how boundary disputes between science and policy are
constructed, contested, and negotiated).
141. Charles Wager Hull, New York Correspondence, 6 PHILA. PHOTOGRAPHER 199, 202
(1869).
142. See, e.g., Hollenbeck v. Rowley, 90 Mass. (8 Allen) 473 (1864); Defendant's Brief, Trial
Records, Blair v. Pelham, 1875 (Supreme Judicial Court Records, Social Law Library, Boston,
Mass.) ("Photographs ... verified by the oath of the photographer, are admissible.").
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could be anyone familiar with the subject matter depicted by the
photograph.143
3. Antievidentialists
The witnesses who testified that they believed in spirits because
they had seen Mumler's pictures and the photographers who testified
that they believed in Mumler's fraud because they had seen his
pictures shared one important conviction: Both believed that
Mumler's photographs provided compelling evidence about something
important. Each group believed that the photographs themselves
revealed evidence of their mode of production, whether by documen-
ting spiritual intervention or by proving Mumler's manipulations. In
contrast to both of these perspectives, Mumler's attorneys took the
position that the photographic images lacked probative value. They
claimed that the photographs themselves simply did not speak to the
issue of Mumler's fraud, that the photographs were not evidence.1"
Their point was that the photographs themselves could not provide
definitive evidence about their mode of manufacture; for this, it was
necessary to look not at the product but at the process. The defense
thus challenged the res ipsa loquitur basis of the prosecution, arguing
instead that the photographs themselves proved nothing about the
process that generated them. As one of the newspapers summarized
the proceedings:
The feature in the "Spirit Photograph" trial yesterday was the
testimony of an amateur expert that he had produced such
photographs, substantially indistinguishable in character from
those [of Mumler] .... and that he could do it so as to avoid
detection even by practical photographers. Of course this only
goes to show that other agencies may produce a result similar to
what is claimed the spirits cause; it does not prove that the
pictures now in question in court have not been produced by
143. See, e.g., McGar v. Borough of Bristol, 42 A. 1000 (Conn. 1899); Archer v. New York,
N.H. & H.R.R., 13 N.E. 318 (N.Y. 1887); Nies v. Broadhead, 27 N.Y.S. 52 (Sup. Ct. 1894);
Udderzook v. Commonwealth, 76 Pa. 340, 343-44 (1874).
144. The attorneys on Mumnler's behalf did make a halfhearted attempt to claim the
photographs had some evidentiary value for their side. In their brief to the court, the attorneys
argued that "in the various attempts to imitate these pictures, and which some photographers
claim are the same thing, there are essential points of difference, plainly to be discovered by the
practical or the discerning eye, and which distinguish the genuine from the false, and which
cannot be produced by the imitator." GERRY, MUMLER ARGUMENT, supra note 112, at 11. The
defense's ten arguments are printed in full in idU at 10-11. In other words, the defense
transmuted the claim of the prosecution that faked photographs looked different from real ones
by arguing that indeed, faked spirit photographs did look different from Mumler's authentic
specimens. Mumler's lawyer, however, made this argument in passing, and the bulk of his
defense rested on the fact that no one had been able to detect any trick or fraud.
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spiritual influences. To prove that is to prove a negative-a task
certainly not at all likely to be accomplished in this case.145
According to the defense, the twenty photographs entered into
evidence in the case were not evidence at all. Proof of fraud could not
come from the photographs themselves. Yet the prosecution had
provided no other proof of fraud. Therefore, the defense maintained,
the action against Mumler had to be dismissed.
In the end, Judge Dowling agreed with the defense, albeit reluc-
tantly. He decided not to send the case to the grand jury, explaining
that "however he might believe that trick and deception had been
practiced by the prisoner, yet, as he sat there in his capacity of
magistrate, he was compelled to decide... [that] the prosecution had
failed to prove the case."'" In so deciding, Judge Dowling asserted
that the photographs themselves did not provide evidence about their
mode of production. If the photographs themselves proved neither the
existence of ghosts nor the existence of fraud, Dowling had no choice
but to dismiss the charges against Mumler.
The photographs in the Mumler case were atypical, not only
because of their unusual subject matter, but because they themselves
were at issue in the case. The photographs were not offered as
evidence regarding the appearance of some external matter; rather,
the entire legal proceeding centered around the images themselves
and the method of their production. Nonetheless, the Mumler case
illustrates two points important to the use of photographic evidence
generally. First, it suggests the indeterminacy of photographic
meaning. The tremendous variation in understandings of the images,
as constituting proof of ghosts, proof of fraud, or no proof at all,
reminds us that we cannot assume that a photograph has a singular
and unproblematic meaning. Second, the Mumler case shows us how
in practice, the paradigmatic understandings of the photograph-as a
mirror with memory, or as a manipulable construct-became
intertwined. The photographers who testified against Mumler thought
that the photograph was capable of being both an instrument of
illusion and an especially objective representation. Mumler's defense
lawyers argued that it was neither one.
These various perspectives can be reconciled by understanding the
photograph as offering what Miles Orvell termed "artificial realism."
Orvell suggested that an understanding of photography as "true to
nature without being wholly nature itself" was the dominant perspec-
tive on photography in the late nineteenth century.47 He argued
145. Spiritualism in Court, N.Y. DAILY TRIB., Apr. 27, 1869, at 2.
146. Spiritualism in Court, N.Y. DAILY TRIB., May 4, 1869, at 2.
147. Miles Orvell, Almost Nature: The Typology of Late Nineteenth Century American
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that Victorians "luxuriated" in the way that the photograph could be
simultaneously real and illusionistic, "one moment celebrating its
capacity for a seemingly literal imitation of reality and the next its use
as a vehicle for fantasy and illusion. '"" Orvell's analysis provides an
especially useful perspective for making sense of the competing
perspectives discussed at the outset of this Part: the conception of the
photograph as fundamentally truthful and the alternative view that
emphasized its artfulness and even its artifice. Orvell pointed out that
the deep cultural fascination with the photograph was the product, at
root, not of either one of these conceptions alone, but of their
seemingly paradoxical coexistence. Like a daguerreotype that reveals
a detailed image from one angle, but when looked at askance
becomes as reflective as a mirror, the pleasure of photography was
produced through its perpetual juxtaposition of mimesis with make-
believe. To a certain extent, Orvell may have overstated this
point-not everyone thought of the photograph as both real and
artificial, and those who privileged one understanding over the other
usually emphasized the photograph's capacity for truthful represen-
tation. His analysis alerts us not only to the centrality of the concep-
tion of the photograph as a producer of illusions, but to the way that
the most sophisticated nineteenth-century viewers of photography
reveled in a complex, multifaceted conception of the medium.
Ultimately, Orvell's rich explication of this aesthetic of photography
emphasizes the difficulty that the new representational form posed in
specifically legal contexts. In most settings, it was not terribly
problematic to think of the photograph as offering both truth and
artifice. In sitting rooms and studios, people could accept these
competing notions and could even enjoy their internal contradictions.
But the magistrate in the Mumler hearing-like other early judges
confronting photographic evidence-did not have the option of
relishing the paradox. To the extent that the photograph was
understood as simultaneously natural and artificial, unmediated and
constructed, a replication and a manipulation, its epistemological
status became tricky indeed. As a natural, unmediated replication, this
"dumb witness" could-offer especially probative evidence: "We cannot
conceive of a more impartial witness than the sun . . . " as the judge
quoted earlier put it. 49  But as an artificial, constructed
manipulation, the photograph deserved no privileged place in the
Photography, in MULTIPLE VIEWS: LOGAN GRANT ESSAYS ON PHOTOGRAPHY 139, 142, 145
(Daniel Younger ed., 1991); see also ORVELL, supra note 97, at 73-102 (discussing the
complexities inherent in the 19th-century conception of photography).
148. ORVELL, supra note 97, at 77; see also JONATHAN CRARY, TECHNIQUES OF THE
OBSERVER (1990) (arguing that the stereoscope in particular was inherently illusionistic).
149. Franklin v. State, 69 Ga. 37, 43 (1882).
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courtroom."5 The puzzle, then, for using photographic evidence in
the courtroom was how to keep these interwoven understandings in
balance. If judges recognized photography's artifice, what limits ought
they to place on its use as evidence? If they recognized its capacity for
truthful representation, how could they exclude it from the
courtroom? As we shall see below, judges and treatise writers came
to agree with Judge Dowling. Though routinely used, the photograph
was deemed, as a matter of formal doctrine, not to be independent
evidence at all.
III. DOCTRINES FOR PHOTOGRAPHIC EVIDENCE
By the middle of the 1880s, doctrine governing photographic
evidence had stabilized. By this time, the prevailing judicial approach
to the photograph was to align it, by analogy, with maps, models, and
diagrams.'51 All of these were viewed as constructed visual aids that
a witness could use to illustrate his testimony. These visual represen-
tations were viewed not as independent evidence but as illustrative
evidence that could aid a witness in communicating his point. The
justification for allowing such representations at all was that some
matters were more easily explained visually than orally; therefore,
witnesses should be allowed to use images whenever the use would
clarify their points. As Wigmore explained in the evidence treatise
that came to be "the Bible of the courts":'52 "It would be folly to
deny ourselves on the witness-stand those effective media of com-
munication commonly employed at other times as a superior
substitution for words., 53
But Wigmore, like those judges who grappled with the status of
photographic evidence, emphasized that these visual media of
communication were not independent, substantive evidence. Rather,
insofar as they were evidence at all, they were evidence because they
150. See The Taylor Will Case, 10 Abb. Pr. (n.s.) 300, 318 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1871).
151. See, e.g., Kansas City, M. & B.R.R. v. Smith, 8 So. 43 (Ala. 1889); Cunningham v. Fair
Haven & W.R.R., 43 A. 1047 (Conn. 1899); Ortiz v. State, 11 So. 611 (Fla. 1892); Adams v.
State, 10 So. 106 (Fla. 1891); Lake Erie & W.R.R. v. Wilson, 59 N.E. 573 (Ill. 1901); Rockford
v. Russell, 9 Ill. App. 229, 233 (1881); State v. Hersom, 38 A. 160 (Me. 1897); Baustian v.
Young, 53 S.W. 921 (Mo. 1899); State v. O'Reilly, 29 S.W. 577 (Mo. 1894); Wurmser v.
Frederick, 62 Mo. App. 634, 636-37 (1895); Albierti v. New York, L.E. & W.R.R., 23 N.E. 35,
38 (N.Y. 1889); Archer v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 13 N.E. 318, 324 (N.Y. 1887); Hampton
v. Norfolk & W.R.R., 27 S.E. 96 (N.C. 1897); Dederichs v. Salt Lake City R.R., 46 P. 656 (Utah
1896); 1 SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 82 n.a (Boston, Little,
Brown & Co. 15th ed. 1892); id. § 439h (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 16th ed. 1899); FRANCIS
WHARTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL ISSUES §§ 544-545 (Phila.,
Kay & Brother 8th ed. 1880); 1 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF
EVIDENCE §§ 790-793 (1904).
152. Letter from John E. Blair, Attorney, to John Henry Wigmore (Feb. 12, 1906)
(Correspondence re Evidence, Box 1, Wigmore Papers, Northwestern University Archives).
153. 1 WIGMORE, supra note 151, § 790.
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constituted a witness's testimony in visual form. Wigmore wrote: "A
photograph, like a map or diagram, is merely a witness's pictured
expression of the data observed by him and therein communicated to
the tribunal more accurately than by words."15" This "pictured
expression of the data," Wigmore stressed, "is evidence, like any other
part of the witness's utterance."' 5 In other words, a photograph,
map, model, or diagram could be used as evidence as long as an
attesting witness proclaimed it a correct representation. The visual aid
was evidence in the sense that it was the witness's own description in
visual rather than oral form. The visual representation itself, however,
was not to serve as proof that the witness's description was accurate,
nor as independent or corroborative evidence.' 6 It was merely the
witness's testimony rendered visually.
Although I have used Wigmore to explicate this doctrine, it was by
no means his invention. It had become the dominant approach to
photographs by the 1880s. Recall, for example, the virtually identical
argument made in the 1881 New York case, Cowley v. People,
comparing photographs to other kinds of portraits. Judges routinely
justified the admission of a photograph by analogizing the photograph
to other sorts of pictures, usually literal pictures, such as portraits or
diagrams, but sometimes to "word-pictures" as well."57
Before a witness could use such a visual aid, he was required to
authenticate the image and verify that it in fact offered a correct
representation of whatever was at issue. Only thus would the picture
be admissible as the witness's testimony. As Wigmore put it, any
visual representation
is, for evidential purposes simply nothing, except so far as it has
a human being's credit to support it. It is mere waste paper-a
testimonial nonentity. It speaks to us no more than a stick or a
stone. It can of itself tell us no more as to the existence of the
thing portrayed upon it than can a tree or ox. We must somehow
put a testimonial human being behind it (as it were) before it can
be treated as having any testimonial standing in court. It is
somebody's testimony-or it is nothing.158
Judging the truth of the visual representation required exactly the
same thing that judging the truth of any testimony required: an
assessment of the credibility of the witness. The use of the explicit
154. 1l § 791.
155. Id. § 790.
156. Id-
157. See, e.g., Baustian v. Young, 53 S.W. 921 (Mo. 1899); see also supra note 91 and
accompanying text.
158. 1 WIGMORE, supra note 151, § 790.
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analogy on which this doctrine was based was an assertion of
similarity between the photograph and other kinds of visual represen-
tation. But implicitly, the doctrine followed the logic in Cowley v.
People, in which all of these forms of evidence were understood as
testimony in another "mode of signs." ' 9
One consequence of this doctrine was to make it logically unneces-
sary that it should be the photographer himself who authenticated a
photographic image. If the photograph were neither to serve as cor-
roborative evidence nor to function in the courtroom as an indepen-
dent form of proof, this specialized ability to read photographic
accuracy was unimportant. The authenticating witness could be
anyone at all, so long as he was personally familiar with the matter
depicted by the representation.
A. Suppressed Truths
As already noted, judicially created doctrine supporting
photographic evidence was built upon an analogy between the
photograph and maps, diagrams, portraits, and drawings. Indeed,
judges asserted not merely an analogy between a photograph and
other kinds of visual representations, but, for evidential purposes, an
identity among them. That is, this doctrine did not merely claim that
a photograph was like other kinds of pictures, but that all kinds of
pictorial representation were evidentially the same.
There is nothing inherently surprising about a judicial turn to
analogy as a tool for making sense of a novel form of evidence.
Analogic reasoning is a legal mainstay, or as Cass Sunstein put it,
legal culture's "most characteristic way of proceeding."'1 6 Judges'
particular expertise is in reasoning through comparison; this process
is at the very heart of the common law.1 61 When confronting a novel
form of evidence, then, why not compare the new to the known?
But all analogies are not created equal. As writers on analogy have
pointed out, the key to analogic reasoning is determining when two
exemplars-be they fact patterns, cases, or forms of evidence-are
relevantly similar. Making this determination is at the core of
reasoning by analogy: "For analogical reasoning to operate properly,
we have to know that A and B are 'relevantly' similar, and that there
are not 'relevant' differences between them .... The major challenge
159. People v. Cowley, 83 N.Y. 464,478 (1881); see also supra notes 90-93 and accompanying
text.
160. Sunstein, supra note 15, at 741.
161. See LEvI, supra note 15, at 2-3.
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facing analogical reasoners is to decide when differences are
relevant."'162
But is there any disciplined way to determine when differences are
relevant? In the most rigorous recent exposition of the nature of
analogical reasoning, Scott Brewer argued that argument by analogy
is not merely the result of a mystical process, but rather, can have a
good deal of rational force. 63 Brewer established a complex schema
for describing how analogies do work-and how they should work if
they are to be rationally compelling." In essence, Brewer acknowl-
edges that analogic reasoning contains an imaginative moment in
which the comparison is born. But he suggests that careful testing of
any given analogy can rein in this semimystical moment of insight and
give an analogy rational force. An analogic reasoner must first
attempt to confirm or disconfirm the particular analogy under
consideration. Then, the reasoner must articulate the rule that governs
the application of an analogy, as well as the rationale that justifies the
rule. Finally, the reasoner must examine whether the governing rule
can be applied deductively to all similar instances. If so, Brewer
claims, then the analogy can be viewed as having significant rational
force. At a formal level, the analogic structure employed by judges in
making sense of photography fulfills Brewer's conditions, which
suggests that we should be inclined to grant this analogy a good deal
of rational force.1'6
And yet, there is something discomfiting about this particular
judicially made analogy. Although photographs share numerous
characteristics with other kinds of visual evidence-they are all
representational, humanly made, and subject to inaccuracies-there
is a way in which a photograph is quite distinct from these other
forms. For even though the photograph may be misleading or
inaccurate, it may also make a special kind of truth-claim that these
162. Sunstein, supra note 15, at 745.
163. See Brewer, supra note 15, at 934.
164. See generally id. Explaining Brewer's detailed and sophisticated terminology and schema
is beyond the scope of this Article. For those already familiar with his argument, I shall attempt
in the footnotes to place the photography example into Brewer's framework.
165. To put the example of photography in Brewer's terminology: We might say that the
characteristics of the "source" of the analogy (a portrait or drawing) are that it is visual,
representational, humanly made, and possibly inaccurate; and that the "target" (photography)
shares these characteristics. What Brewer calls our "analogy-warranting rule," id. at 962-77,
would state that when an object is visual, representational, humanly made, and possibly
inaccurate, that provides sufficient warrant for inferring that it should be treated as illustrative
rather than substantive evidence. At least at a logical level, this structure fulfills Brewer's
"entailment" requirement, id. at 968-71, for analogy-warranting rules. The "analogy-warranting
rationale" in this instance might be something like "all evidence that is visual and potentially
misleading needs to be curbed or controlled to prevent bad results."
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other forms of representational evidence cannot. The analogy that
judges built ignored the photograph's veridical power.
To make the consequences of this doctrine concrete, suppose a
witness testified about the location of certain objects, and used a
diagram or a photograph to show the location of these objects.
According to the doctrine, whether he used a diagram or a
photograph, whether the picture were "made solely by the hand of
man, or through the agency of photography,"'" was irrelevant.
Either way, the image only illustrated his testimony in visual form.
The doctrine thus failed to confront an obvious distinction between
a diagram and a photograph. The diagram, indeed, simply illustrated
the witness's argument. But to whatever extent the photograph was
viewed as a replication and not merely a representation, it might in
fact corroborate the witness. That is, a photograph might do more
than illustrate; it might persuade. Yet the doctrine promoted one
understanding of the photograph-the image as artifice-over the
other-the image as replication.
The doctrine regarding the admissibility of photographs thus reified
a conception of photography as a human construction-manipulable,
fallible, and potentially untrustworthy. The widespread sense of
photographic truthfulness, the belief that, unlike a drawing or a
diagram, a photograph might be interpreted not just as a likeness but
as reality depicted, was cast aside.
In practice, however, as an effort to make photographs the
operative equivalent of other kinds of visual evidence, the doctrine
was only partially successful. That is, even though the doctrine
ignored the widespread belief in photographic truth, the awareness of
the photograph's special probative power could not be suppressed
entirely. Thus, although the one strain of thinking-that photographs
were humanly constructed representations-formally regulated the
admission of photographic evidence, the other strain-that
photographs often seemed to be unmediated transcriptions of
reality-continued to exist within the cases as a counterpoint.
This alternative strain is sometimes visible in judges' assertions in
statements that make sense only in light of the submerged perspec-
tive. For example, in admitting a photograph, judges sometimes
pointed out that no testimony in the record suggested that the
photograph Was incorrect or misleading.'67 Doctrinally, whether or
166. See Ortiz v. Florida, 11 So. 611, 613 (Fla. 1892).
167. See, e.g., Archer v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 13 N.E. 318 (N.Y. 1887) (pointing out
that the evidence of a photograph's accuracy "was not disputed"); Nies v. Broadhead, 27 N.Y.S.
52, 53 (Sup. Ct. 1894) (stating that the evidence that the photographs offered correct
representations "was not contradicted"); cf Scott v. New Orleans, 75 F. 373 (5th Cir. 1896)
(approving admission of a photograph that counsel forcefully suggested was inaccurate, but
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not such testimony existed ought to have been irrelevant. That is, if
a photograph were understood merely as someone's testimony in
illustrated form, the fact that it was disputed by other testimony might
affect its weight and credibility, but not its admissibility. As long as
one sworn witness had verified that a relevant photograph was a
correct representation of that which he had seen, the image ought to
have been admitted-even if other witnesses (or, for that matter,
other images) contested its accuracy. And yet, if the judges recognized
that in practice a photograph did more than illustrate, that it might,
in fact, be seen as proof of that which it represented, their concern
with whether there was consensus about its accuracy becomes quite
understandable. Similarly, judges were sometimes reluctant to admit
photographs that they viewed as misleading, even when authen-
ticated.1" According to judicial doctrine, the question of whether an
authenticated photograph was misleading was a determination
properly for the jury. Such caution was sound practice only if judges
suspected that in practice photographs not only illustrated but
certified.
Furthermore, the cases themselves show that as a matter of actual
practice the use of photographs was not just to clarify testimony but
to prove matters of fact. For example, in a Massachusetts larceny trial,
Commonwealth v. Morgan,69 a dispute arose over whether the
defendant, an alleged thief had ever worn whiskers and a mustache.
Witnesses for the defendant denied it, but a government witness
supported his claim with a photograph of the defendant sporting
whiskers. Clearly the photograph was intended not merely to illustrate
the witness's testimony; rather, it was concrete evidence supporting
the witness's assertion that the alleged thief had worn whiskers.
suggesting that the jury should be carefully instructed about the possibility that photographs
could mislead); Dorsey v. Habersack, 35 A. 96, 96-97 (Md. 1896) (allowing a photograph even
though one party insisted that it was an inaccurate representation).
168. See, eg., Ortiz v. State, 11 So. 611 (Fla. 1892) (rejecting a photograph of an injury site
because of its peculiar perspective, even though the photographer explained the angle from
which it was taken); Cleveland, C.C. & St. L. Ry. v. Monaghan, 41 11. App. 498, 502 (1891)
(rejecting a photograph of an obstructed railway track because the obstruction pictured, though
supported by detailed testimony that it was "substantially the same" as the one at issue, was not
identical); People's Passenger Ry. v. Green, 56 Md. 84 (1880) (rejecting a photograph of a street
car accompanied by testimony that it was an "exact representation" of the car upon which an
accident occurred because it was not in fact the car upon which the accident occurred); Gilbert
v. West End St. Ry., 36 N.E. 60 (Mass. 1894) (rejecting a one-year-old photograph of the
plaintiff introduced to give some idea of his age and health, accompanied by testimony that it
was a "good likeness" and that his appearance had not changed in the intervening year, on the
ground that photographs "may be taken to make the person appear younger and less infirm than
he is"); Hampton v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 27 S.E. 96 (N.C. 1894) (approving the exclusion of
photographs of the scene of injury because of the passage of time, although there was evidence
that the photograph was accurate and the locality had not changed).
169. 34 N.E. 458 (Mass. 1893); see also Trial Records, Commonwealth v. Morgan, 1893
(Supreme Judicial Court Records, Social Law Library, Boston, Mass.).
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Similarly, in a criminal case against a charitable organization for
mistreating a child, the state supported its arguments with two
photographs of the child, one showing him robust and healthy before
he had been in the charity's care, the other revealing him to be
emaciated and sickly as a result of the charity's negligence. These
images, of course, did not simply illustrate what the witness meant
when he said that the child looked unhealthy. They showed the
transformation and allowed jurors to gaze upon the child's miserable
condition with their own eyes.1 70
In a probate case in which an illegitimate child of the deceased was
suing for inheritance, a judge allowed a composite image showing a
photograph of the child next to a photograph of the putative
father.171 The purpose of admitting these photographs was not
merely to illustrate testimony asserting resemblance between the two
(indeed, such opinion evidence would not have been deemed
admissible), but to show the resemblance. Although the judge
indicated his discomfort with relying too heavily on resemblance to
prove kinship, he did not exclude the photographs." In practice,
whenever a photograph was introduced to explain a disputed fact
rather than to provide the jury with a general visual sense of the
scene of a crime or accident, it inevitably operated as both illustration
and documentation. The photograph not only displayed but verified.
Occasionally, courts explicitly acknowledged this double role. One
judge, for example, gave the standard doctrinal explanation, declaring
photographs:
not in themselves evidence at all, but representing to the eye
what the witness declares was the real appearance of the thing at
the time he saw it. Diagrams, drawings, and photographs are
resorted to only because the witness cannot, with language, as
clearly convey to the minds of the court and the jury the scene
as the light printed it on the retina of his own eye, at the time of
which he is testifying. 73
But two paragraphs earlier, the judge pointed out that while a
photograph's accuracy must be determined by testimony, "after that
foundation has been laid, the photograph speaks with a certain
probative force in itself."' 74 Occasionally judges openly declared that
photographs provided compelling, independent proof, like the
170. See Cowley v. People, 83 N.Y. 464, 476-77 (1881).
171. See In re Jessup, 22 P. 742, 744 (Cal. 1889).
172. See id.
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Georgia judge who admitted, "We cannot think of a more impartial
and truthful witness than the sun .. .
Most judges were not so explicit. In general, the official doctrine
operated in tandem with the unofficial-and unacknowl-
edged-reality. Photographs were formally admitted as illustrations,
as no more than a witness's testimony in visual form. But in practice,
these same photographs may well have been independently persua-
sive, a form of proof. As the author of a practical treatise on
photographic preparation and presentation later put it:
When the accuracy of a photograph taken during or immediately
after the event in controversy has been proved, no judge or jury
really considers the photograph as a mere map or diagram of the
situation.... [T]he circumstances under which such photographs
are made often give them attributes of spontaneity and veracity
that no hand-drawn picture can ever have. 176
The doctrine, then, must be understood as a legal fiction, a formal
rule that coexisted with a reality that contradicted it. Such fictions are
necessarily uneasy. If the reality that contradicts the rule becomes too
apparent, the rule itself may founder. Or, as occurred in the case of
photographic evidence, the gap between the formal rule and the
reality may lead to uncomfortable outcomes."
B. The Problem of Posed Photographs
Posed photographs became a serious problem for courts in the last
two decades of the nineteenth century. Beginning in the 1880s, a
number of cases involved photographs that had been carefully
constructed to illustrate the placement of relevant people or objects.
These photographs were staged, after-the-fact reconstructions
purposefully designed to illustrate one side's theory of the case. Often
these photographs showed the scene of the accident or crime, with
individuals (sometimes those actually involved, sometimes not)
carefully positioned in the places where the parties claimed they had
been at the time of the crime or accident. 78 On other occasions,
witnesses made marks on the photograph to indicate the placement
175. Franklin v. State, 69 Ga. 37, 43 (1882).
176. SCoTr, supra note 7, § 602 (2d ed. 1969).
177. Note that in Brewer's conception of how analogies should operate, unacceptable
outcomes should lead to a change in the "analogy-warranting rule." See Brewer, supra note 15,
at 1023. In practice, of course, as the history of photographic evidence suggests, it is not so
simple. Judges often ignore or finesse the rule or the outcome that an analogy suggests rather
than rethinking the analogy itself.
178. See, e.g., Shaw v. State, 9 S.E. 768 (Ga. 1889); Rodick v. Maine Cent. R.R., 85 A. 41
(Me. 1912); Fore v. State, 23 So. 710 (Miss. 1898); State v. O'Reilly, 29 S.W. 577 (Mo. 1894);
People v. Jackson, 19 N.E. 54 (N.Y. 1888); State v. Kelley, 24 S.E. 60 (S.C. 1896).
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of specific people at the time in question. 179 According to the
doctrine governing photographic admissibility, such staged images
should not have presented any difficulty. These photographs allowed
witnesses to show the jury pictorially that which they had seen, in
order to make their testimony clearer and more vivid. This was
precisely the purpose for which photographs, maps, models, and
diagrams were supposed to be used.
Some courts did admit these staged or marked photographs. In one
case, after a photograph was taken of the scene of the murder, the
state's attorneys made marks upon it to indicate where witnesses said
that the victim and the defendant had been. The defense attorney
objected to the admission of these marked photographs, but the judge
overruled the objection. The appeals court agreed with the trial judge:
"We may assume that every one now understands the limitations
upon the use of the photograph. It presents but one point of view,
and may sometimes make an unfair representation of the points at
issue."'" Just because a photograph represented the point of view
of a particular party was no reason, doctrinally, to exclude it. Another
judge had equally little difficulty admitting a photograph taken after
a shooting, showing the interior of the saloon where the murder had
taken place, "on which were grouped three prearranged figures" to
indicate the positions of the accused, the deceased, and the deceased's
father.' Another court defended the admission of a staged
photograph as "indicat[ing] in a general way the impression left upon
the mind of the witness," and "aid[ing] his oral statement."'" All of
these decisions followed quite naturally from an application of the
doctrine equating a photograph with other kinds of diagrams or il-
lustrations.
But a number of judges vehemently opposed the admission of these
posed pictures.'" As one judge wrote:
To be admissible, photographs should simply show conditions
existing at the time in question. But photographs taken to show
more than this, with men in various assumed postures, and things
in various assumed situations, in order to illustrate the claims and
contentions of the parties, should not be admitted.... They
would serve merely to illustrate certain theories of the defendant
179. See, e.g., People v. Crandall, 57 P. 785 (Cal. 1899).
180. IU at 787.
181. O'Reilly, 29 S.W. at 578.
182. Jackson, 19 N.E. at 55.
183. See, e.g., Babb v. Oxford Paper Co., 59 A. 290 (Me. 1904); Stewart v. St. Paul City R.R.,
80 N.W. 855 (Minn. 1899); Fore v. State, 23 So. 710 (Miss. 1898).
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as to how the accident happened. They were properly excluded
as a matter of law.1"
Despite the judge's adamance, he neither explained the legal principle
upon which these photographs were barred nor cited any precedents.
Another judge confronted his discomfort with these images more
directly. In holding such photographs inadmissible, he wrote:
They were not simply reproductions of the scene of the homicide.
They were photographic representations of tableaux vivants,
carefully arranged by the chief witness for the state, whereby his
version of the tragical occurrence should be brought vividly
before the mind's eye of the jury, and be impressed upon the jury
as the view of the actual occurrence, and not as the mere
statement of the facts .... Their effect if not their purpose, was,
by photographic processes, to strengthen and bring out in striking
captivating fashion... [his] version .... Their only effect was to
graven upon the jury's memory the account of the homicide
given by the witness,-an account at variance with that of at least
two other eyewitnesses .... Indeed, with the average jury, these
dumb witnesses, created by the joint efforts of the state's leading
witness and the photographic artist, might go far to secure a
verdict for the party offering them.1"
According to this judge, staged photographs were dangerous and
unfair. In the guise of illustrating, they could persuade. But the
doctrinal justification for admitting the photograph denied the image
its ability to tell a story in "striking captivating fashion." A conflict
among the states over whether staged photographs should be
permitted persisted at least until the 1950s, though gradually more
and more states admitted such images."s Although the judicial
consensus was, in the end, congruent with the general doctrine
governing the admissibility of photographs, the disputes over staged
photographs dramatically highlighted the fiction of the formal
doctrine."s
184. Babb, 59 A. at 292.
185. Fore, 23 So. at 712.
186. Compare Cincinnati, N.O. & Tex. Pac. Ry. v. Duvall, 92 S.W.2d 363 (Ky. Ct. App.
1936), and Langley v. State, 213 P.2d 886 (Okla. Crim. App. 1950), with People v. Crowe, 61
N.E.2d 348 (111 1945), and Lynch v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R., 61 S.W.2d 918 (Mo. 1933). See
generally G.J.C., Annotation, Admissibility of Posed Photographs Based on Recollection of
Position of Persons or Movable Objects, 27 A.L.R. 913 (1923); R.B. Kaman, Annotation, Admi-
ssibility of Posed Photographs Based on Recollection of Position of Persons or Movable Objects,
19 A.L.R.2d 877 (1951).
187. The formal doctrine also posed significant difficulty when x-rays were first brought into
the courtroom as evidence. Authentication requires a witness to assert that a representation is
correct based on personal knowledge. In the case of an x-ray, no one could have actually
observed the body's internal structure and the bones depicted; hence authentication was
impossible. Moreover, that which a physician illustrated by means of an x-ray he had learned
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C. Explaining the Legal Fiction: How Judges Defused Novelty
Through Analogy
Given the awkwardness and tension that unavoidably adhered to
the official doctrine, why did this legal fiction emerge? Why, we might
ask, did the courts keep the photograph's visual power partially
hidden from sight? What explains the doctrinal insistence that
photographs were not independent evidence, but merely "a witness's
pictured expression of the data observed by him"?"s To begin to
answer this question, we must first break it down into two distinct
parts: first, why courts felt the need for an authentication requirement
for the photograph; and second, why they refused to acknowledge that
the authenticated photograph could have independent probative force.
The first question is the easier one to answer. As we have seen, the
possibility that photographs could be misleading or manipulated was
widely recognized;1" this fact by itself suggests the need for tes-
timony attesting to the photograph's accuracy. A photograph could
not merely be presumed accurate; it had, as Wigmore put it, to be
sponsored by testimony."g Had judges not required authentication,
they would have allowed the photograph to be literally self-proving
as a form of evidence. A photograph's mere existence would have
provided evidence of that which it depicted. But just as Judge
Dowling in no way believed that Mumler's photographs themselves
proved the existence of ghosts, judges in general were not willing to
assert that a photograph proved its own contents. Moreover,
authentication was required for all documentary or real evidence.
"The necessity of authentication... applies equally well to a knife,
from the x-ray itself; the x-ray was not an illustration of that which he already knew or observed.
Nonetheless, as early as 1897, courts did deem x-rays admissible. See Smith v. Grant, 29 Chicago
Legal News 145 (1896); Bruce v. Beall, 41 S.W. 445 (Tenn. 1897); Evidence: The X Ray, 31 AM.
L. REV. 268 (1897). Although the earliest cases tended to admit radiographs based on vague
laudings of the modem miracles of science, over time courts dispensed with authentication in
the strict sense, and substituted a requirement that a person testify that "the instrument or
process is known to be a trustworthy one," both in general and in the specific case. 1 WIGMORE,
supra note 151, § 795. In other words, judges replaced a substance-oriented understanding of
authentication for a process-oriented one. Eventually, judges took judicial notice that properly
taken x-rays resulted in correct representations, so that admitting an x-ray required only
testimony establishing that in the instance at issue it had been properly taken and interpreted.
But if admitting an x-ray required testimony only about process and not about product, why
should a photograph not be the same? Why could a witness not testify merely that the
photograph was a product of a properly functioning camera and therefore should be admissible?
In fact, such a theory did develop in the 1960s in order to make admissible the images taken
from regiscopes and surveillance cameras. These moments of doctrinal transformation lend
support to a realist, rather than a formalist, understanding of legal categories and legal change.
188. 1 WIGMORE, supra note 151, § 792.
189. See supra Section II.B.
190. See 1 WIGMORE, supra note 151, § 790.
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a horse, a coat, or a machine, as to a letter or other writing." '191
Especially given the possibility of manipulation, there was no affir-
mative reason to exempt photographs from this requirement.
The puzzle concerns judges' reluctance to acknowledge that a
photograph with testimonial sponsorship might have independent
probative value; it might, indeed, be evidence. Judges could have
required that photographs be authenticated, but granted that, once
proved genuine, they had independent evidentiary force. To put the
problem concretely, why did the courts not treat a photograph more
like a deed than a diagram? Four partial answers intersect at several
points. Most significantly, judges were unlikely and sometimes
unwilling to innovate, preferring instead to analogize the photograph
to familiar forms. But the judicial turn to this particular analogy also
reflects other anxieties distinctive to photographic evidence. For
example, judges may have been inclined to value words in the
courtroom more than images, and the analogy that they created both
reflected and preserved this hierarchy. Moreover, judges may have
been threatened by the potential institutional challenge posed by
evidence that promised (or threatened) a high degree of certainty. By
declaring photography mere illustration, they limited its challenge to
traditional judicial authority. Finally, judges may have wished to
preserve their authority over the decision to admit individual
photographs rather than to delegate the authority to photographers.
By analogizing the photograph to other kinds of visual evidence,
judges insured that they, rather than extrajudicial experts, would
control which images were admitted into evidence.
1. Defusing Novelty Through Analogy
Perhaps the most compelling explanation for the judicial reluctance
to acknowledge doctrinally the veridical power of the photograph is
the desire of judges not to innovate. Judges may have wanted to
assimilate this new technique to existing forms, to defuse its novelty
by equating it with established methods. Understanding the
photograph as a new path to truth in the courtroom was threatening;
viewing it as another example of a known category tamed the
medium. By declaring the photograph to be like a painting or a verbal
description, merely a "description in another mode of signs," 92 not
fundamentally different from any other description, oral or written,
judges gave to the photograph both kin and ancestry. It acquired
legitimacy.
191. 3 id. § 2130.
192. Cowley v. People, 83 N.Y. 464, 478 (1881).
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As one judge wrote, "From time immemorial it has been customary
to use diagrams and plans in the trial of criminal as well as civil
cases . . . ."'93 In fact, diagrams and plans had been used within the
courtroom only in circumscribed ways.1" Still, a genuinely new form
of evidence could be disruptive and destabilizing; better, then, for a
judge to conceptualize the photograph as another iteration of already
established representational forms. By analogizing the photograph to
maps and drawings, judges were able to finesse questions about the
admissibility of a new form of evidence. If this new form of evidence
were substantially the same as already existing forms, it raised no
troubling questions; indeed, it need hardly be deemed new. Thus, in
the official doctrine, there was little intellectual space for the recog-
nition of either photography's mechanical nature or its transcriptive
power, both of which distinguished the new technology from its kin.
The analogy itself constricted the vision of photographic evidence.
The following three explanations for the emergence of this doctrine
focus on why the particular constricted understanding of the
photograph may have appealed both to the judges making sense of
photography and to the lawyers who were bringing photographs to
court.
2. Protecting the Reign of Words
One explanation for the formal devaluation of photographic
evidence may be that the courts were uncomfortable granting images
pride of place within the courtroom. A trial, at its core, is a battle of
language. In the adversarial model of the trial, well entrenched by the
nineteenth century, truth emerges, at least in theory, through each
side's presentation of its story and interrogation of its opponent's
narratives. The opportunity to cross-examine-to probe, to call into
question, to challenge the words of the other side's witnesses-is
crucial to the system's functioning. Non-verbal evidence, from alleged
murder weapons to blood-streaked clothing could be admitted, but
only upon adequate authentication by a human being who could be
cross-examined. One ongoing concern about the admission of
photographs was that they were structurally impossible to cross-
examine. Unlike a witness, who was under oath and "subject to
examination,.., the photograph may testify falsely with im-
193. State v. O'Reilly, 126 Mo. 597, 599 (1894) (statement of counsel); see also 1 GREEN-
LEAF, supra note 151, § 439g (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 16th ed. 1899) ("That a witness may
properly communicate his knowledge in the form of a map, drawing, or diagram, has never been
doubted.").
194. See infra Section IV.A.
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punity.' "'9 Only if a photograph were deemed nothing more than
the testimony of its human sponsor could this difficulty be avoided.
Of course, blood-streaked clothing and written contracts are
structurally impossible to cross-examine as well. But photographs,
unlike murder weapons, are themselves representations, and potent
ones. They tell a story about the world, making a difficult-to-refute
claim about how a particular location looked at one instant.' 96 The
story may be indeterminate; it may be capable of multiple
interpretations, but to whatever extent this visual depiction is not tied
to testimony, a competing, nonverbal account enters a space where
the words of witnesses-and lawyers-are supposed to reign. Deeds,
contracts, and other forms of documentary evidence may also be
representational, but they are verbal, not visual. A document cannot
prove the truth of its own contents in the way that a photograph
might. No one would ever call a document "a witness on whose
testimony the most certain conclusions may be confidently
founded."'97 As Roland Barthes wrote in his reflections on
photography, "the Photograph's essence is to ratify what it
represents, '  to confirm to the viewer that "That-has-been."' 99
Perhaps as representations that suggested the possibility of substan-
tiating their own contents, photographs threatened the hegemony of
testimony. If photographs had probative force, they could evade the
web of words. Nineteenth-century lawyers and judges may have
endeavored to fasten them securely to human beings by labeling
photographs mere communicative aids, illustrative of testimony. In
short, judges kept words in the picture.'
195. Defendant's Brief, Trial Records, Gilbert v. West End Highway, 1893 (Supreme Judicial
Court Records, Social Law Library, Boston, Mass.) ("It may be said that the description of a
witness may be as misleading as the portrait, but the witness is under oath, subject to
examination, and the false lines in his verbal description may be corrected, but the photograph
may testify falsely with impunity."); see also State v. O'Reilly, 29 S.W. 577 (Mo. 1894).
196. As Roland Barthes wrote:
Photography's Referent is not the same as the referent of other systems of representation.
I call "photographic referent" not the optionally real thing to which an image or a sign
refers but the necessarily real thing which has been placed before the lens, without which
there would be no photograph. Painting can feign reality without having seen it. Discourse
combines signs which have referents, of course, but these referents can be and are most of
the "chimera." Contrary to these imitations, in Photography I can never deny that the thing
has been there. There is a superimposition here: of reality and of the past. And since this
constraint exists only for Photography, we must consider it, by reduction, as the very
essence, the noeme of Photography.
BARTHES, supra note 3, at 76.
197. Morton, supra note 60, at 190.
198. BARTHES, supra note 3, at 85.
199. Id. at 77.
200. For suggestive accounts of the uneasy relation between images and law at the moment
of the common law's foundation in the early modem period, see PETER GOODRICH, OEDIPUS
LEX (1995). For a discussion of the discomfort of modem-day lawyers with the visual sphere,
see ETHAN KASCH, LAW IN A DIGITAL WORLD (1995).
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3. A Fear of Certain Evidence
Let us return, very briefly, to The Octoroon. Scud asserted as he
showed the photographic plate to the jurymen: "Look there. 0, you
wanted evidence-you called for proof-Heaven has answered and
convicted you." 1 This line contains the seed of another possible
reason for judicial discomfort with photographic evidence: Judges may
have felt that photographs risked being overly authoritative, too
certain. Once heaven has convicted someone, what need is there for
an earthly trial? Would not perfect evidence make a trial unneces-
sary? More generally, if there exists evidence both absolutely
probative and utterly irrefutable, the trial itself is rendered a
formality, the playing out of the inevitable rather than a site for
decisionmaking and the exercise of judgment. To put the issue in its
starkest form, if a photograph caught a perpetrator in the act, why
would one need a jury (or lawyers or a judge) at all? In such an
instance, when the photograph itself displayed the facts with "an eye
that cannot be deceived and a fidelity that cannot be corrupted, '' 2°
what theoretical purpose would there be for a factfinder? How could
a jury do anything other than certify "truth itself in the supremeness
of its perfection"?' Evidence that offered an exceptionally high
degree of certainty was at one and the same time the ideal toward
which the system strove and the El Dorado that might threaten the
system altogether.
In practice, of course, such concerns would arise only when a
photograph actually displayed the critical moment at issue in a trial,
as did the miraculous photographic plate in The Octoroon. But recall
that the judicial doctrine governing photographs was cemented in the
1880s, exactly when instantaneous and even surreptitiously taken
photographs had become feasible, a moment when the fear of
photographic "cranks" from whom nothing could be kept secret
circulated widely. Moreover, the idea that the photograph would
capture criminal instants for the purpose of legal proof is nearly as old
as photography itself.' Of course, post-Rodney King, we can no
longer believe that photographs offer certain and incontestable
narratives; we are more likely to agree with Susan Sontag that a
photograph's meaning comes about only through the relation between
the image and its caption or its context.' 5 And as the Mumler trial
201. BOUCICAULT, supra note 53, at 486.
202. Morton, supra note 60, at 190.
203. Poe, supra note 59, at 198.
204. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
205. See SONTAG, supra note 4, at 106-08.
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illustrates, even in the nineteenth century, the conception of
photographic realism had its limits. As a medium capable of offering
displays that could affect the jury in a "striking captivating fashion,"
machine-generated visions with an aura of certainty and incontes-
tability, photographic evidence posed a threat to the very process of
the trial.' By declaring photographs the equivalent of other
representational forms, judges ensured that they would not provide an
institutionally threatening degree of certainty.
No nineteenth-century judge or attorney declared forthrightly that
he viewed the photograph as an institutional threat, that its promise
of too-certain evidence worried him. But it is a plausible way of
understanding judicial reluctance to grant what was so freely
acknowledged outside of the courtroom: that photographs were
indeed evidence. By understanding the photograph as the pictured
expression of a witness rather than as independent evidence, judges
demoted the photograph from the nearly irrefutable to the merely
illustrative. In so doing, they preserved not only the jury's factfinding
function, but also the courtroom as a place for judgment.
4. Letting Judges Judge Photography
A fourth possible explanation for the judicial decision to view
photographs as nothing more than eyewitness testimony in visual form
may have stemmed simply from the recognition that photographs
could be manipulated. Photographers, judges, and many others
understood that photographs did not necessarily represent reality in
a truthful or complete manner. Photographs could lie, making any
presumption of accuracy unwarranted.
Recall from the discussion of the Mumler trial that photographers
claimed a particular expertise in the interpretation of
photographs.' It would seem, then, that if photographs were to be
admitted into the courtroom as substantive evidence, they should first
be certified by a photographer-a qualified expert-as worthy of
belief. Without such a certification, judges might admit into evidence
images that were as misleading as they were persuasive. This was
precisely the fear of the author who labeled photographs "a most
dangerous perjurer."2 °n
But any certification scheme adopted to authenticate photographs
would have presented problems. Photographers were not a well or-
ganized professional group. Some kinds of photographers had
downright shady reputations-itinerant photographers in particular
206. Franklin v. State, 69 Ga. 37, 43 (1882).
207. See supra notes 137-141 and accompanying text.
208. The Photograph as a False Witness, supra note 94.
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were often portrayed as shiftless and untrustworthy.' How then,
were judges to know which photographers ought to be able to certify
a photograph's accuracy? This is, of course, merely one instance of a
pervasive phenomenon: judges have difficulty assessing expert
qualifications in any specialized branch of knowledge. The problem
would have been especially acute in this instance, however, because
the lack of substantial professional organization on the part of
photographers would have made reliable photographic experts hard
to find. Officially approved photographs might also have been viewed
as especially trustworthy, even conclusive. The approach would thus
have delegated a great deal of power to the certifiers. Judges may
have preferred to ensure that they and they alone retained the
discretion to designate a particular photograph admissible or
inadmissible.
No suggestion for a formal certification scheme appeared in late-
nineteenth-century sources. But in several early cases, it was deemed
necessary for the photographer himself to authenticate the
photograph.1 In later cases, once a photograph was understood to
be illustrative of testimony, anyone who had personally observed what
was depicted could legitimately authenticate the image.2" If the
photograph had been viewed as substantive, independent evidence,
only someone able to certify the photograph's accuracy would have
been a legitimate authenticator-such as a professional photographer.
Thus, by analogizing photographs to other kinds of visual evidence,
judges kept for themselves the power of judging.
IV. THE EMERGENCE OF DEMONSTRATIVE EVIDENCE AND A
"CULTURE OF CONSTRUCTION"
A. The Limited Use of Visual Evidence Prior to Photography
One of the reasons why judges made sense of the photograph by
analogy was to provide the new technology with a history. This judge-
made heritage was, if not disingenuous, at least far less obvious than
many of the judges made it seem. In the first two-thirds of the
nineteenth century, there existed no well-developed general eviden-
tiary category of "models, maps, and diagrams." Rather, it appears
that maps and plats were routinely used in only one sort of case:
those in which boundaries were at issue, normally cases involving
trespass or land disputes. Often, the maps or plats used were official
209. See TAFT, supra note 16.
210. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
211. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
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ones, such as state-approved surveys. Alternatively, the court might
appoint a surveyor to make a plan of the land at issue, with both
parties present. But occasionally, a question arose concerning the
admissibility of a plan made by a surveyor who was neither court-
appointed nor acting in a quasi-official capacity. The general rule
appears to have been that such surveys "[could] never be used but as
chalk." '212 As a judge put it in an 1827 land dispute, such "a
representation in the form of a plot presenting to the eye, a picture,
as it were... cannot be evidence. But although not legal proof, it
may be used by the parties to explain the evidence., 213 The lan-
guage in these cases often sounds like that later appropriated by the
courts for the more general category of photographs, models, maps,
and diagrams. As one judge said, a surveyor could use a plat "to
make his testimony more intelligible to the jury";2 1 1 in the words of
another, "although such survey may not within itself be
evidence.., that he may illustrate his evidence by the survey so
made, we entertain no doubt., 215
Prior to the 1880s, diagrams were used at the trial level in some
cases,2"6 but beyond land disputes they were very rarely made the
subject of appeal.1 7 Other evidence, moreover, suggests that "maps,
models, and diagrams" was not a broad evidentiary category, but
rather a narrowly defined grouping generally thought to apply only to
specific categories of cases. In an 1858 libel case, in which a dissatis-
fied patient published an advertisement in the newspaper claiming
that a particular dentist was "a miserable bungler, and a disgrace on
the profession," the defendant tried to illustrate what the dentist had
done to his teeth with an engraving representing his teeth before and
212. Bearce v. Jackson, 4 Mass. (3 Tyng) 408, 410 (1808). This is the earliest case I have
located where such a plan is at issue.
213. Johnston v. Kirkland, 6 Mart. (n.s.) 337, 339 (La. 1827); see also Shook v. Pate, 50 Ala.
91 (1873); Carter v. Doe, 21 Ala. 67 (1852); Cundiff v. Orms, 7 Port. 58 (Ala. 1838); Rose v.
Davis, 11 Cal. 133 (1858); Mincke v. Skinner, 44 Mo. 92 (1869).
214. Cundiff, 7 Port. at 61.
215. Carter, 21 Ala. at 71.
216. This assertion is based on a perusal of several dozen early-19th-century trial transcripts
published in pamphlet form, as well as a complete reading of three volumes of American State
Trials. For an example of the uncontested use of a diagram, see, for example, Trial of Judge
Wilkinson, Dr. Wilkinson, and John Murdaugh for Murder, 1839, in 1 AMERICAN STATE TRIALS
132, 243 (1914).
217. In one murder case, a surveyor, as a witness for the defense, exhibited during his
testimony a map he had made of the area, illustrating various routes and localities connected
with the alleged crime. The court did allow this use, and it was upheld on appeal, the judge
asserting that as a general rule "a witness may use a plat, diagram or map, made in any way, to
explain or make himself intelligible to a jury." State v. Castleberry, 23 Ala. 44, 83 (1853). And
in one other murder case, a physician's use of a diagram to illustrate his testimony-a represen-
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after the dental work. The judge refused to admit the drawing. The
plaintiff's attorney, arguing that this refusal was no error, stated,
[This] was not a case in which engravings or drawings would be
necessary to communicate the facts intended. It was not an action
of ejectment, in which a survey and plat, by an authorized
surveyor, would be admissible to show boundaries. It was not a
case of patent right of some complicated machinery, where a
drawing might be useful to show the exact infringement
complained ot Nor was the witness an expert, called upon to
demonstrate some scientific fact not understood by common
minds, wherein drawings might be useful to illustrate such fact.
He was not deaf and dumb, that signs and pictures were neces-
sary for the communication of his ideas.21
The court agreed with the attorney, asserting that "this is not a case
in which a drawing was necessary to illustrate the fact asserted., 219
In the middle of the nineteenth century, courts did not accept that
witnesses had a general privilege to use such visual representations.
Instead, their use as a matter of right was confined to those cir-
cumstances in which they were not merely useful but "necessary."
In reports of patent cases, the reporters sometimes apologized for
the inclusion of drawings in their report:
The learned Justice ... refers to the "large museum of exhibits
in the shape of machines and models" which had "been
presented to the court," ... to give... a proper understanding
of the merits of the controversy.... Drawings-of which but
three can here be given-supply imperfectly originals thus ad-
vantageously presented. Without them, however, no idea at all
can be had of the case, and the reporter trusts that... he will be
excused for encumbering a book of law reports with drawings,
which in the eyes of a casual observer, will give to it the aspect
of a treatise on physical science, more than the aspect of one on
the science of jurisprudence.'
Of course, to receive a patent, an applicant was required by law to
submit drawings and a model of his invention. These extant and
legally required visual representations were essential in patent
disputes. Indeed, in both categories of cases in which visual represen-
tations were frequently used and habitually the subject of appeal, the
visual representations predated the lawsuit and had official legal
sanction. Official surveys were acknowledged as evidence, and judges
218. Thrall v. Smiley, 9 Cal. 529, 534 (1858) (argument of counsel).
219. Id. at 537.
220. Burr v. Duryee, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 531, 532-33 (1863); see also Winans v. New York &
E.R.R., 62 U.S. (20 How.) 88 (1858); McCormick v. Talcott, 61 U.S. (19 How.) 402 (1857).
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had explicitly held that juries could look to the drawings and visual
representations submitted with patent applications to interpret a
patent.221 Visual representations were made the subject of appeal
when the representations were understood to be evidence--or, as in
those cases involving unofficial maps in land disputes, when the visual
representations hovered close to the boundaries of evidence.
Finally, it is worth pointing out that in nineteenth-century treatises
on evidence written prior to the 1880s, unofficial models, maps, and
diagrams were not discussed at all, though official surveys did receive
attention.' For example, Simon Greenleaf's treatise provided no
discussion of either photographs or unofficial maps until the thirteenth
edition, published in 1876. In this edition, the author mentioned
photographs for the first time, within the section on proof of disputed
handwritings, but he did not discuss maps, models, and diagrams as
illustrative aids.2' In the fifteenth edition, published in 1892, he
gave photographs somewhat more attention, within a discussion of the
"best evidence" rule. The treatise called photographs "an appropriate
aid to the jury in applying the evidence in the same manner as
drawings, diagrams and maps," although the treatise still did not
comment on these other "aids to the jury."'  It was only in the
sixteenth edition, in which the treatise was substantially revised,
enlarged and annotated by John Wigmore, that "maps, drawings,
diagrams [and] models" actually received treatment within the
text.22
It appears that when judges placed the photograph within a general
framework of visual representations as explanatory aids, they were
221. See Swift v. Whisen, 23 F. Cas. 563 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1867) (No. 13,700); Hoffbeins v.
Brandt, 12 F. Cas. 290 (C.C.D. Md. 1867) (No. 6575).
222. See, e.g., 1 GREENLEAF, supra note 151, § 139 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 13th ed.
1876); JAMES F. STEPHENS, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (St. Louis, F.H. Thomas 2d
ed. 1879). Treatises do discuss official, registered surveys or official town maps, but these, as
substantive evidence, were not equivalent to the unofficial representations at issue here.
223. See 1 GREENLEAF, supra note 151, § 581 n.1 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 13th ed.
1876). He also mentions that courts have taken judicial notice of photographic accuracy. See id.
§ 6 n.5.
224. Id. § 82 n.a (15th ed. 1892).
225. Id. § 439g (16th ed. 1899); see also Robert D. Brain & Daniel J. Broderick, The
Derivative Relevance of Demonstrative Evidence: Charting its Proper Evidentiary Status, 25 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 957 (1992). Although their article contains much of interest, Brain and Broderick
misread the early history of demonstrative evidence. They accurately detail the failure of many
early evidence handbooks and treatises in England and America, see JEREMY BENTHAM,
RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE (London, Hunt & Clarke 1827); GEOFFREY GILBERT, THE
LAW OF EVIDENCE (Dublin, Sarah Cotter 1754); GREENLEAF, supra note 151, to discuss
demonstrative evidence. But Brain and Broderick misinterpret this across-the-board omission.
In Gilbert's case they call it an "error," and in Bentham's "a perplexing and significant"
omission. Brain & Broderick, supra, at 990, 991. By treating the omission as a mistake, they fail
to historicize the understanding of what constitutes evidence. That is, they miss the crucial point:
These kinds of exhibits were not considered to be evidence. These scholars did not inadvertently
leave the subject out, but they did not think that it belonged in an evidence treatise.
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doing more than simply linking this new technology to a well-
established category. They were, in part, inventing the category, or at
least expanding it dramatically. This conceptual expansion also proved
to be a practical invigoration. In the 1880s and 1890s, not only were
photographs frequently used in the courtroom and made the subject
of appeals, but models, maps, and unofficial diagrams also became
popular courtroom devices.
B. The Rise of Visual Representations
The photograph-and the resulting construction of a broad category
of models, maps, and diagrams-triggered a swell of visual represen-
tations in the courtroom. These diagrams and models, of course, were
in no way technologically dependent upon the photograph; that is, it
was perfectly possible to construct such images well before the 1880s.
Yet it was only with the advent of photography as an evidentiary aid
that these visual representations became ordinary courtroom tools.
Even more significant, it is only with the advent of photography that
the use of these other representational forms came to be viewed as
worthy of contestation and appeal.
After 1880, models, maps, and unofficial diagrams were not only
used with frequency, but often were made the explicit subject of
appeals to higher courts. A sampling includes diagrams of allegedly
defective railroad crossings;2" diagrams of the locality of a mur-
der;' diagrams or sketches of the scene of an accident;"
diagrams of the location where a railroad car ran over and killed a
horse; 9 diagrams of the buildings where a burglary took place, also
showing the direction of the tracks left by the offender;' a model
of an allegedly defective railroad engine;"' a model of a coal bucket
that injured a plaintiff; 2 and an elaborate scale model of the church
where a murder took place.23
The language used in these cases makes it clear that by the 1880s,
diagrams and maps had become a widely accepted form of represen-
tation in the courtroom, not at all limited to particular classes of
226. See Western & At. R.R. v. Stafford, 25 S.E. 656 (Ga. 1896); Tankard v. Roanoke R.R.
& Lumber Co., 23 S.E. 46 (N.C. 1895).
227. See Fuller v. State, 23 So. 688 (Ala. 1897); Burton v. State, 22 So. 585 (Ala. 1896);
Commonwealth v. Hourigan, 12 S.W. 550 (Ky. 1889).
228. See Southern Pac. Co. v. Hall, 100 F. 760 (9th Cir. 1900); Western Gas Const. Co. v.
Danner, 97 F. 882 (9th Cir. 1899); Bunker Hill & S. Mining & Concentrating Co. v. Schmelling,
79 F. 263 (9th Cir. 1897); County Comm'rs v. Wise, 18 A. 31 (Md. 1889).
229. See East Tenn., Va. & Ga. R.R. v. Watson, 7 So. 813 (Ala. 1889).
230. See Ragland v. State, 70 S.W. 1039 (Ark. 1902).
231. See Augusta & S.R.R. v. Dorsey, 68 Ga. 228 (1881).
232. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Kelly, 40 N.E. 938 (I11. 1895).
233. See People v. Durrant, 48 P. 75 (Cal. 1897); see also John Wigmore, The Durrant Case,
30 AM. L. REV. 29 (1896).
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cases. As one judge put it in 1889: "Diagrams and maps illustrating
the scene of a transaction, and the relative location of objects, . . . are
always admissible, at the instance of either party, in order to enable
the court and jury to more clearly understand and apply the facts in
evidence."'' Other judges called the use of such representations
"frequent practice,"235 "common ... and clearly legitimate," 6 and
"too common.., to meet with anything but our approval." 7 In
addition, by the 1880s, the use of such images was not a matter of the
trial judge's discretion; unjustifiably excluding a relevant diagram,
map, or model verified by a witness amounted to error.238
The emergence of photography thus led to the generalization and
articulation of a new evidentiary category, whose boundaries and
effects stretched beyond the technology that spurred it. Maps, models,
drawings, and diagrams were carried into the courtroom on the
photograph's coattails. Once the general category was established, all
of these representational forms began to be understood in evidentiary
terms. Prior to the advent of the photograph, drawings, maps, and
models, unless they were officially sanctioned, were not concep-
tualized as evidence; they were thought of as merely illustrative. As
we have seen, the photograph itself, in the formal judicial understan-
ding, was also viewed as an illustration rather than as evidence. And
yet, despite this doctrinal declaration, it proved impossible for the
photograph not to be understood as evidence. The photograph was
conceptually viewed as evidence almost from the moment of its
invention-it was "a witness on whose testimony the most certain
conclusions may be confidently founded."' 9 The sheer force of
doctrine alone could not keep the photograph secure in a box labeled
"illustration"; the strong realist conception could not simply be left
behind at the courthouse door. A major consequence of linking
photographs to models, maps, and diagrams was that all of these
forms of representation began to acquire the sheen of evidence.
Instead of defusing the photograph by declaring it mere illustration,
the doctrine brought into existence a new epistemological category:
234. East Tenn. Va. & Ga. R.R. v. Watson, 7 So. 813, 814 (Ala. 1890) (emphasis added).
235. State v. Whitaker, 3 S.E. 488, 489 (N.C. 1887).
236. Poling v. Ohio River R.R., 18 S.E. 782, 786 (W. Va. 1893).
237. Jordan v. Duke, 53 P. 197, 200 (Ariz. 1898); see also Western Gas. Const. Co. v.
Danner, 97 F. 992, 996 (9th Cir. 1899) (concluding that it is "a common and proper prac-
tice ... to receive models, maps, and diagrams, or sketches, drawn on paper, or traced with
chalk on a blackboard, for the purpose of giving a representation of objects and places which
cannot otherwise be as conveniently shown or described by the witnesses to the jury.").
238. See, eg., Commonwealth v. Hourigan, 12 S.W. 550, 552 (Ky. 1889); State v. Whitaker,
3 S.E. 488 (N.C. 1887). In earlier land-related cases, it was often thought to be a matter of the
court's discretion whether to allow a witness to use unofficial maps or surveys. See, e.g., Brantly
v. Huff, 62 Ga. 532, 533 (1879).
239. Morton, supra note 60, at 181.
[Vol. I0: 1
64
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [1998], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol10/iss1/1
Mnookin
visual representations, not officially proof but nonetheless compelling.
Though photographs are not technically evidence, treatises on
evidence from the 1890s onwards invariably discuss them. And the
rash of appeals involving all of these categories suggests that lawyers
and clients deemed them important enough to contest. Thus the
photograph-and the judicial response to it-brought into existence
a new epistemic category that hovered uncomfortably on the
boundary between illustration and proof.
C The Emergence of a Culture of Construction
A significant consequence of this new epistemic category was a
change in the process of assembling evidence. Some of the
photographs used in legal cases existed prior to the case itself.
Sometimes, the photograph was an image taken years or months
before. But more often-especially in the 1880s, once dry-plate
technology was in widespread use-photographs were taken especially
for use in court. In the many cases that used diagrams, drawings, and
elaborate scale models, these demonstrative forms were often created
specifically for the trial. Witnesses, attorneys, plaintiffs, and defen-
dants actually went out and made evidence themselves. Preparing for
a case no longer involved merely locating appropriate people and
objects; it was now likely to involve actively creating a representation.
Evidence was something to be constructed as well as collected. More
and more often, presenting a case entailed not only telling a story, but
depicting it visually, whether through photographs, diagrams, or
models, in order to bring matters directly to the senses of the jury.
The controversial posed photographs discussed earlier are a clear
example of this process of evidence construction.' But it was not
only when parties staged photographs that they constructed evidence
post hoc. Every time someone took a photograph after a suit had
begun, or prepared a diagram or a scale model, they were, in a sense,
manufacturing evidence.
These forms of visual evidence were often especially persuasive, for
they let jurors see for themselves, rather than hearing secondhand the
reports of percipient witnesses. Photographs offered a convenient way
of capturing-and framing-the outside world and bringing it directly
before the jury's eye. "The photograph brings the spot to the jury,"
explained one judge, in defending the use of a stereographic represen-
tation of the scene of the accident.241 Indeed, these forms of
240. See supra notes 178-187 and accompanying text.
241. Of course, jurors often were allowed to view the locus in quo. This kind of out-of-court
site visit turned the jurors into firsthand witnesses of the scene to an even greater degree than
when they peered at photographic depictions of the site.
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evidence turned jurors themselves into virtual witnesses, able to see
the evidence for themselves, directly with their own eyes.
Judges tried to tie these visual representations to testimony, but-as
the discomfort that some judges expressed with posed photographs
indicated 24 -they had a power and a potency beyond the word. The
judges' insistence that photographs were neither novel nor troubling
rings hollow. The late nineteenth century thus witnessed the birth and
development of a new way of establishing truth: the emergence of a
"culture of construction" within the courtroom. Evidence was now
something not only to be found, but to be made.
Even contemporary commentators recognized that a qualitative
change had occurred. In an eight-part article entitled Practical Tests
in Evidence, Irving Browne wrote,
In the early and rude ages there was a strong leaning toward the
adoption of demonstrative and practical tests upon disputed
questions. Doubting Thomases demanded the satisfaction of their
senses.... As society grew civilized and refined, it seemed
disposed to despise these demonstrative methods, and incline
more to the preference of a narration, at second-hand, by eye
and ear witnesses. But in this busy century there seems to have
been a relapse toward the earlier experimental spirit, and a
disposition to make assurance doubly sure by any practicable
method addressed to the senses. And so in recent days the
instances have been numerous, and are constantly growing more
numerous, of a resort to exhibitions, experiments, and tests made
out of court and proved by testimony, or in court before the eyes
and ears of the jury called on to pronounce upon the issue of
fact.243
Browne did not distinguish between direct presentations, such as the
exhibition of a wound, and representations, such as photographs and
diagrams. But he showed that a change in the mode of proof had
indeed taken place; that proving something now often required letting
a jury see for itself, appealing to jurors not only through argument,
but directly through the senses. The corollary of appealing directly to
the eye of the jury was that those involved in lawsuits had to
manufacture demonstrative evidence: put together the exhibits, shoot
the photographs, draft the diagrams, and build the models. At least
to a certain extent, seeing had become believing.
242. See supra Section III.B.
243. Irving Browne, Practical Tests in Evidence (pt. 1), 4 GREEN BAG 510, 510 (1892); see
also Irving Browne, Practical Tests in Evidence (pts. 2-8), 4 GREEN BAG 555 (1892); 5 GREEN
BAG 13, 60, 129, 185, 222, 268 (1893).
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D. Demonstrating Evidence to the Senses and Sensing
Demonstrative Evidence
The emergence of this epistemic category is an origin story of sorts
for what we now refer to as "demonstrative evidence." Although
definitions of demonstrative evidence vary, it is generally understood
as "[tihat evidence addressed directly to the senses without interven-
tion of testimony.... Such evidence... [that] illustrate[s] some
verbal testimony and has no probative value in itself."'2' According
to such a definition, demonstrative evidence sounds like precisely the
epistemic category that emerged from the judicial response to the
photograph.
To assert baldly that the photograph and the doctrine invented to
govern its admissibility brought "demonstrative evidence" into being
is, however, slightly to overstate the historical case. For
"demonstrative evidence," so-named, did not yet have a stable
meaning by the turn of the century. In the later part of the nineteenth
century, judges still used "demonstrative evidence" primarily to refer
to that evidence that offered the highest possible degree of proof,
evidence established through deduction from agreed-upon premises,
evidence that therefore produced complete certainty of knowledge. As
a federal judge wrote in 1886, "nothing should be accepted as
sufficient, except upon the most indisputable and demonstrative
evidence."'245 "Demonstrative" was, in this usage, essentially a
synonym for "conclusive," 2' often with explicitly mathematical
overtones.247 As the American and English Encyclopedia of Law
explained it, "None but mathematical truth is susceptible of that high
degree of evidence called demonstration, which excludes all possibility
of error, and which, therefore may reasonably be required in support
of every mathematical deduction .... In the ordinary affairs of life
we do not require demonstrative evidence."2"
244. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 432 (6th ed. 1990).
245. Hardt v. Liberty Hill Consol. Mineral & Water, 27 F. 788, 790 (C.C.D. Cal. 1886).
246. See, e.g., The Telephone Cases, 126 U.S. 1, 477 (1888) (counsel describing evidence as
"ample, complete and demonstrative"); Manning v. Hayden, 16 F. Cas. 645, 650 (C.C.D. Or.
1879) (No. 9043) ("The coincidences are most convincing, but one is almost demonstrative.");
Ward v. The Fashion, 29 F. Cas. 181, 188 (C.C.D. Mich. 1854) (No. 17,154) (referring to
"intelligent, demonstrative, and conclusive evidence"); Delachaise v. Maginnis, 11 So. 715 (La.
1899); Allison Bros. v. Allison, 38 N.E. 956,959 (N.Y. 1894) (quoting Chancellor Kent as saying
that "the most demonstrative proof" was required before a court should find a mutual mistake
to have been made in a contract).
247. See, eg., Klein v. Livingston Club, 35 A. 606 (Pa. 1896) (describing the reasoning and
conclusions of a judge as "almost as demonstrative of the truth as the solution of a problem in
geometry"); GREENLEAF, supra note 151, § 1 (13th ed. 1876). For an interesting discussion of
the relation between philosophical notions of probability and proof and legal ones, see
BARBARA SHAPIRO, BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT AND PROBABLE CAUSE 220-41 (1991).
248. 9 AMERICAN AND ENGLISH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW 218 (2d. ed. 1898) (quoting
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The example of demonstrative evidence was sometimes used in
judges' instructions to juries describing that which was not needed for
a conviction:
What circumstances will amount to proof can never be a matter
of general definition; the legal test is the sufficiency of the
evidence to satisfy the understanding and conscience of the jury.
Absolute, metaphysical and demonstrative certainty is not
essential to proof by circumstances; it is sufficient if they, with all
the other evidence, produce moral certainty to the exclusion of
every reasonable doubt.249
This conception of demonstrative evidence had nothing whatever to
do with that category of proof that we have been discussing; rather,
it was that which resulted from strict logical deduction.
But by the early part of the twentieth century, "demonstrative
evidence" was beginning to be used in a second sense as well: to refer
to evidence that expressed itself directly to the senses. In this second
sense, several lawyers and judges stated explicitly that photographs
were a species of demonstrative evidence. One attorney argued before
the Ohio Supreme Court that photographs
are often useful to enable courts and juries to comprehend
readily the question in dispute as affected by the evidence, but
we think that the use of photographs has always been considered
as secondary or demonstrative evidence, the latter in the sense
that the photograph is competent whenever it is important that
the place, object, person or thing be described to the jury.'
This second meaning of demonstrative evidence seems to have
corresponded to that category of visual representations-maps,
models, diagrams, and photographs-under discussion in this Article,
with the further inclusion of in-court experiments, jury views, and
sometimes "real" evidence as well." A second conception of
Hopper v. Ashley, 15 Ala. 457, 467 (1849), quoting 1 GREENLEAF, supra note 151, § 1 (Boston,
Charles C. Little & James Brown 2d ed. 1844).
249. Myers v. Florida, 31 So. 275,280 (Fla. 1901) (quoting the trial judge's instructions). This
instruction seems to have been standard practice in Florida. See, e.g., Jenkins v. State, 18 So. 182
(Fla. 1895); Kennedy v. State, 12 So. 858 (Fla. 1893); Whetston v. State, 12 So. 661 (Fla. 1893).
This language comes directly from 1 THOMAS STARKIE, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW
OF EVIDENCE 447-48 (Philadelphia, P.H. Nicklin & T. Johnson 5th ed. 1834) (emphasis added).
For nearly identical language, see also Carlton v. People, 37 N.E. 244 (Ill. 1894), and Otmer v.
People, 76 Ill. 149 (1875).
250. Cincinnati, H. & D. Ry. v. De Onzo, 100 N.E. 320 (Ohio 1912); see also Milton v.
Cargill Elevator, 144 N.W. 434 (Minn. 1913); Stewart v. St. Paul City Ry., 80 N.W. 855 (Minn.
1899).
251. I do not mean to suggest, however, that this category was consistently defined; for
example, the century edition of the American Digest, published in 1897, included under the
category of "demonstrative evidence" models, enlargements, exhibitions of persons, wounds, and
real evidence, while photographs, maps, and diagrams were designated as a species of
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demonstrative evidence, understood not as mathematical, conclusive
proof but as proof that demonstrated something directly to the senses
of the jury, had begun to take hold.
Early in the twentieth century, some judges and commentators
began to blend together the two meanings of demonstrative evidence,
suggesting that evidence that presented itself to the senses was an
especially secure form of proof As a Florida Supreme Court judge
explained in a disputed document case involving the photographic
reproduction of signatures:
In the use of demonstrative evidence, one relies upon the
evidence of his own senses. It is therefore evidence of the highest
rank. It is the ultimate test of truth. To this class belongs
mathematics, because a proposition of mathematics may be es-
tablished by the evidence of one's own senses. 52
The judge declared demonstrative evidence to be especially certain,
drawing upon the long tradition of mathematics as "demonstrative,"
but transformed the rationale upon which such a declaration had
traditionally been based from deduction by logical means to the
(erroneous) claim that mathematics could be confirmed by one's own
senses. This conflation was neither random nor careless. Rather, it
stemmed from a sense that demonstrative evidence, defined as
evidence that presented itself directly to the senses, could indeed
provide a compelling form of proof Nor was this conflation simply
the confusion of a single judge; in his influential Treatise On Facts,
Charles Moore declared under the heading "demonstrative evidence,"
"The highest proof of which any fact is susceptible is that which
presents itself to the senses of the court or jury."253
An interesting oscillation in doctrine and practice appears in such
reasoning. Demonstrative evidence such as maps, models, diagrams,
and photographs offered only secondary evidence-testimony in visual
form. But at the same time demonstrative evidence, as "evidence of
one's own senses, furnish[ed] the strongest probability and, indeed,
the only perfect and indubitable certainty of the existence of any
sensible fact."'  Demonstrative evidence was thus seen both as a
documentary evidence. See 20 AM. DiG. §§ 676-683 (century ed. 1900). Interestingly, this
categorization scheme-real evidence, models, enlargements, etc., as demonstrative evidence;
photographs, maps, and diagrams as documentary evidence--continues through the present.
252. Boyd v. Gosser, 82 So. 759, 761 (Fla. 1919).
253. 1 CHARLES C. MooRE, A TREATISE ON FACTS § 159 (1908).
254. &d Note, however, that this preference for direct sense perception is itself far older than
the category "demonstrative evidence." For an early-19th-century case articulating this
preference directly, from which Moore quotes in describing and explicating demonstrative
evidence, see Gentry v. McMinnis, 33 Ky. (3 Dana) 382, 386 (1835).
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privileged form of proof and as mere illustration with no independent
probative value.
Demonstrative evidence has continued to hover awkwardly on the
boundary between illustration and proof. In their analysis of the topic,
Robert Brain and Daniel Broderick described the tremendous
conceptual confusion that still besets "demonstrative evidence,"
pointing out that "there is not even a settled definition of the
term." 5 Some commentators define demonstrative evidence to
include all evidence that consists of "things" rather than testimony,
"all phenomena which can convey a relevant firsthand sense impres-
sion to the trier of fact." 6 Others limit its definition to those
displays "principally used to illustrate or explain other testimonial,
documentary, or real proof. . . a visual (or other sensory) aid." 7
Some definitions deem it substantive, independent evidence, while
others insist it serves merely the secondary, derivative purpose of il-
lustration. 28
Exploring the origins of the category sheds light on the ongoing
theoretical confusion. From its beginnings, demonstrative evidence
challenged evidential categories, operating as more than illustration
but less than proof. Understanding the central role played by
photography in provoking the articulation of the more general
categories of visual and demonstrative evidence reveals a significant
source of this confusion. The dissonance between formal definition
and practical function that the photograph embodied carried over into
the more general category of demonstrative evidence. And the
conception of this category both as mere illustration and as the
ultimate form of proof was further legitimated by a semantic
conflation of two senses of demonstrative evidence. We might even
say that the instability of the epistemic category was the ultimate
result of the judicial analogy between photography and hand-drawn
images. This genealogy of demonstrative evidence thus makes it into
a more comprehensible-and a more interesting--category than is
generally recognized.
V. CONCLUSION
The story of photography's routinization in the courtroom offers a
case study in analogic reasoning. Viewed from this perspective, the
255. Brain & Broderick, supra note 225, at 960.
256. CHARLEs T. McCoRmIcK, McCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE § 212, at 390 (4th student ed.
1992); see also Brain & Broderick, supra note 225, at 960.
257. Brain & Broderick, supra note 225, at 968.
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history of photographic evidence is simultaneously an account of the
power of analogies and a cautionary tale about their limits. That
judges responded to the photograph with an analogy is not, in and of
itself, either surprising or interesting; the common law is fundamental-
ly built on analogic thinking.' 9 Yet analogizing the photograph to
other forms of visual representation resulted not merely in treating
the photograph like a map or diagram for evidentiary purposes, but
in transforming the treatment and understanding of the entire
category of visual representations.26 In other words, the very
category was a product of the analogy. As we have seen, once the
photograph was analogized to the diagram, not only was the
photograph deemed admissible evidence, but diagrams, maps, and
models were themselves treated differently.61 The analogy thus
affected the legal status not only of the new element-what Brewer,
in his discussion of analogic reasoning, calls the "target"-but of the
already existing ones as well-what Brewer refers to as the "sou-
rces."262 In this sense, the history of photography in the courtroom
provides a compelling example of the transformative powers of
analogy.
This case study simultaneously reveals the limits of analogies. By
analogizing photography to other kinds of visual representations,
judges confined the photograph to a secondary status as illustrative
evidence, rather than recognizing it as independent proof They
contended that the photograph illustrated testimony rather than
corroborated it. Their analogy reified a conception of the photograph
as a human construction, not fundamentally different from other
species of man-made visual representations.
Yet, in practice, their analogy could not function as a straitjacket.
The widespread belief-within the general population and the
judiciary-in photographic truth, the notion that a photograph was
more authoritative than other kinds of visual depiction, could not be
suppressed by analogic fiat. Even as judges insisted on their mere
illustrative function, photographs often operated as independent,
substantive proof of an especially persuasive kind. Moreover, the
understanding of the photograph as "evidentiary" exerted a pull on
the entire category of which it was an element, giving visual represen-
tations in general a peculiar status at the boundaries of evidence,
affirming them as persuasive even if not quite proof. In this sense, the
judicially made analogy not only failed to keep the photograph in its
259. See id. at 754, 781.
260. See supra Sections IV.B-D.
261. See supra Section IV.B.
262. Brewer, supra note 15, at 966.
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place, but it gave authority and significance to categories of represen-
tations that had not previously been deemed noteworthy.26
Brewer's discussion of analogic reasoning details the way that
argument by disanalogy-argument that focuses on characteristics that
items do not share-often transforms our understanding of the source
of the disanalogy. Disanalogies, he explains, "rewrite the rule
articulated by the earlier judge (the judge of the source case) by
adding new conditions to the bundle of jointly sufficient conditions in
the original rule."2" In other words, after a disanalogy, the original
rule looks different; the making of a distinction implicitly adds a new
condition to the original rule, and thus transforms it. But neither
Brewer nor Sunstein, the two most thoughtful recent commentators
on the legal use of analogies, notice the way that analogies themselves
can transform not only the target but the source. In the case study
presented here, precisely such a bidirectional transformation took
place. Analogizing the photograph to other kinds of pictures affected
the way that the other kinds of images were understood at least as
much as it affected the understanding of the photograph.
This case study in analogic reasoning suggests that in practice,
we-as jurors, judges, lawyers, and participants in legal culture-may
be able to tolerate a good deal of ambiguity in our construction of
legal concepts. In Brewer's model of analogic reasoning, the rational
force that analogies may have depends to a significant degree on our
willingness to engage in "reflective adjustment" of our analogies in
light of the conclusions that they generate. Put simply, Brewer
suggests that if we do not like a result implied by an analogy, we had
better be willing to change the analogy, and if we deeply believe in
the rationale for an analogy, we had better be willing to live with the
results it generates.26 This case study suggests that, in practice,
judicial action may not actually be so reasoned or so reasonable.
Judges may ignore an analogy in a particular instance-as some
judges did with staged photographs-without discarding the analogy
in principle. Or they may use the analogy and recognize its inade-
quacy at the same time, like those judges who allowed photographs
into evidence as illustration, knowing that they would operate to some
extent as substantive evidence as well. Despite the tensions that
inhered in it, the judicially made analogy survived. Recognizing the
endurance of problematic analogies does not diminish Brewer's formal
model as a formal model. But it provides a concrete illustration of a
263. See supra Section IV.C.
264. Brewer, supra note 15, at 1011.
265. See Ud at 1023.
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point that Sunstein notes in passing: "Analogical reasoning may
perpetuate confusion... where reflective equilibrium would not. ' 21
The vestiges of the nineteenth-century understanding of
photographic evidence survive even now. Arguing that it illustrates a
witness's testimony continues to provide one method for laying a
foundation for the use of a photograph in the courtroom today.267
However, the significance of this "illustrative" approach to
photography has been whittled away. Over the course of the twentieth
century, an alternative theory for the admissibility of photographs has
emerged-a "silent witness" theory that recognizes photographs to be
substantial evidence.2  This alternative theory and the "illustrative
evidence" theory have not been-and probably cannot be-fully
reconciled, for they represent two quite distinct understandings of the
kind of evidence photographic images can provide. But judges and
lawyers have muddled along; the conceptual confusion has not often
hindered actual practice. This is not to suggest that the formal
doctrine matters not at all, but rather that evidentiary practices can
be made to work even when incompletely theorized.
Judges, of course, continue to grapple with the legal status of new
technologies, and a frequent judicial trope focuses on the appropriate
analogy or metaphor for comparing the new to the known.' Over
266. Sunstein, supra note 15, at 783.
267. See MCCORMICK, supra note 256, § 214, at 394.
268. For cases relying on and explicitly discussing a silent witness theory, in which a
photograph is acknowledged to "speak for itself," and is admitted into evidence on the basis of
the reliability of the process rather than an eyewitness's testimony, see United States v. Goslee,
389 F. Supp. 490 (W.D. Pa. 1975); Midland Steel Prods. v. International Union, 573 N.E.2d 98
(Ohio 1991); State v. Pulphus, 465 A.2d 153 (R.I. 1983); and Ferguson v. Virginia, 187 S.E.2d 189
(Va. 1972). See also MCCORMICK, supra note 256, § 214, at 395-96; 3 WIGMORE, supra note 151,
§ 790, at 220 n.4 (Chadboum rev. 1970) (arguing for the reception of photography as a silent
witness); Berger, supra note 10 (supporting the silent witness theory if an adequate foundation
is laid); Gardner, supra note 10 (advocating the treatment of photography as a silent witness).
269. See, e.g., JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE
CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY at x (1996) (arguing that we should shed our
"image of the romantic author" when rethinking intellectual property rights in an information
society); Vincent M. Brannigan, Biotechnology: A First Order Technico-Legal Revolution, 16
HOFSTRA L. REV. 545, 549 (1988) (attempting to model the dynamics of technico-legal change
and suggesting that the key theme is that legal change requires reinterpretations of existing rules
with different "groups stak[ing] out claims as to which prior legal analogy is most relevant" to
the legal assimilation of the new technology); E. Donald Eliott, Against Ludditism: An Essay on
the Perils of the (Mis) Use of Historical Analogies in Technology Assessment, 65 S. CAL L. REV.
279 (1991) (arguing that reasoning by analogy to the familiar when confronted with novel
technologies is inevitable but perilous); A. Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor is the Key:
Cryptography, the Clipper Chip, and the Constitution, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 709 (1995) (showing
the effects of different metaphorical conceptions of cryptography, such as analogizing it to a car,
a safe, a language, or a house); Trotter Hardy, The Proper Legal Regime for "Cyberspace," 55
U. Prr. L. REV. 993 (1994) (focusing on how to determine when previously existing categories
and legal analogies can be mapped onto cyberspace without difficulty and when cyberspace in
fact raises new or different legal problems); David R. Johnson & Kevin A. Marks, Mapping
Electronic Data Communications onto Existing Legal Metaphors: Should We Let Our Conscience
(and Our Contracts) Be Our Guide?, 38 VILL. L. REV. 487 (1993) (arguing that cyberspace can
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the past century, judges (and legislatures) have confronted tech-
nological novelty and its legal consequences countless times, often
debating whether to assimilate a new technological product to an
already existing one: automobiles to carriages;270 computer programs
to literary works;271 DNA profiling to fingerprinting;2 2 and so
forth. Currently, the legal status of cyberspace and the appropriate set
of analogies for its regulation are much at issue.273
This study of the history of photographic evidence in the courtroom
offers three broad lessons for analysis of the legal reception of new
technologies. It shows, first, that the legal assimilation of new
technology cannot take place in a vacuum, because broader cultural
conceptions of the technology's meaning necessarily affect its legal
status. Second, analogies may have transformative effects in both
directions, changing understanding not only of the novel entity, the
target, but also of the sources, the preexisting entities that form the
basis for the analogy. Domestication may result in transformation; by
trying to avoid change, judges may end up bringing it about. And
third, this study suggests that analogies matter, but they are not all
that matters. The evidentiary understanding of the photograph was
not fully bounded by the analogy that formed the basis for its formal
status. The categories we choose may confine us but constraint
derived from classification is never complete. Analogies may guide us
but they do not provide an iron cage.
be mapped by too many metaphors for analogic reasoning to be useful); Pamela Samuelson,
Law and Computers: The Quest for Enabling Metaphors for Law and Lawyering in the
Information Age, 94 MICH. L. REv. 2029 (1996) (book review discussing how recent books on
information technology urge readers to jettison "disabling metaphors" of the past when
confronted with technological change).
270. See, e.g., Doherty v. Inhabitants of Ayer, 83 N.E. 677, 678 (Mass. 1908) (holding that
an automobile, though "a carriage in the broad sense of the word" was not so under a particular
statute).
271. See, e.g., Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F. 2d. 1222,1234 (3d Cir.
1986); Bernstein v. Department of State, 922 F. Supp. 1426, 1436 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
272. See, e.g., Smith v. Deppish, 807 P.2d 144, 158 (Kan. 1991) (citing State v. Ford, 392
S.E.2d 781, 784 (S.C. 1990)); State v. Olivas, 856 P.2d 1076, 1093 (Wash. 1993) (Utter, J., concu-
rring). But see United States v. Jakobetz, 747 F. Supp. 250, 258 (D. Vt. 1990) (asserting that the
"fingerprinting" analogy is misleading), affd, 955 F.2d 786 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 834
(1992). Many cases use the term "DNA fingerprinting," some putting "fingerprinting" in quotes
to suggest its metaphoric quality, others not.
273. See. e.g., Hardy, supra note 269; Johnson & Marks, supra note 269; Samuelson, supra
note 269.
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